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When law students are asked to articulate legal rules in a persuasive com-
munication such as a brief, they may experience internal tension. Their version of 
the rule, as framed to benefit a particular client’s position, may be different from 
the way they would articulate the rule if they were not taking on an advocate’s 
role. The conflict between those two versions of a legal rule leads some students 
to wonder if advocacy itself is deceptive, if an advocate’s role requires one to 
sacrifice ethics for success, and if ancient Greek philosophers were correct when 
they derided persuasive communication as “trickery and magic,” and criticized 
advocates for making arguments that were “artfully written but not truthfully 
meant.” This tension is not unique to students. All advocates must ask themselves 
whether they can provide a true and accurate version of the law (truthful law) 
and simultaneously articulate a version of the law that will help their clients. This 
question speaks to the very nature of law and what it means to be a lawyer. If the 
question is not successfully resolved, students and lawyers are more susceptible 
to the cynicism and discontent that permeates the legal profession. 
Using Plato’s denunciation of rhetoric and rhetoricians as a starting point, 
Part I of this Article will explore how the first year of law school may create and 
exacerbate tension between law students’ desire to advocate on behalf of their 
clients and their desire to truthfully communicate the law. Part II will explore 
how law school could resolve this tension with an explicit discussion of legal de-
terminacy and the lawyer’s role in creating law: what students need to hear, 
when they need to hear it, and where that conversation might be placed within 
the curriculum. This Article will identify the developing area of professional iden-
tity formation as a natural location for an effective discussion, which would ide-
ally occur within the first year of studies. In that discussion, law students can ex-
 
*  Professor of Law, Legal Practice, University of Richmond School of Law. Special thanks 
to the Classical Rhetoric and Contemporary Law reading and discussion group, for many 
stimulating conversations about the intersection of these fields; to Lori Johnson, Sue Proven-
zano, and the Nevada Law Journal Editorial Board, for organizing and coordinating the 
Classical Rhetoric as a Lens for Contemporary Legal Praxis Symposium at the University of 
Nevada Las Vegas School of Law, September 26–28, 2019; and to the participants at that 
symposium for their helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks to Linda Berger, Kaci Bish-
op, Jessica Erickson, Brian Larson, MariLee Mifsud, Melissa Weresh, and my UR Law writ-
ing colleagues Christopher Corts, Doron Samuel-Siegel, and Tamar Schwartz for their re-
view and feedback on draft versions of this article. Research assistants Gemma Fearn and 
Julianna Meely provided invaluable assistance. Finally, my thanks to Dean Wendy Perdue 
for supporting this scholarship. 
20 NEV. L.J. 1079 
1080 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:3  
plore a view of lawyers as meaning-makers and truth-tellers: rhetoricians who 
understand and are faithful to the true essence of a law but are also able to create 
alternatives within the scope of that true law. Students and lawyers can integrate 
their own identities into this professional identity and maintain authenticity in 
their advocacy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Each year, when I introduce persuasive communication to my first-year 
law students, a significant group of them express discomfort. The students have 
spent substantial time and effort developing skills necessary to extract rules of 
law from legal sources, synthesize those sources, and articulate a rule of law 
that a court is likely to use to resolve a dispute. Now, I ask them to create a new 
and, quite possibly, different rule of law: one that, if applied, will benefit the 
client’s position. They must create and express a version of the law based not 
only on what they believe the law to be, in the sense that it already exists, but 
based on what it might be, and to base their articulation on the client’s needs 
rather than some sense of absolute correctness. 
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Students may experience this as problematic. Their reactions range from 
mild puzzlement to significant distress, as they struggle to articulate rules of 
law in a way that benefits their client’s positions. Questions arise: Is it fair to 
tell a court that “the law is such-and-such” when I advocate for my client, 
when I would articulate the rule of law differently if advising the client on a 
course of action, or predicting what rule the court will use? Are the persuasive 
techniques we learn simply tricks to manipulate my reader? What right do I 
have to twist the law to make my client’s case seem more attractive? 
My students may not know it, but they are expressing the same concerns 
voiced centuries ago in ancient Greece, when rhetoric—what Aristotle was to 
later call “the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of per-
suasion”—was in its infancy.1 Then, philosophers critiqued the new art as 
“trickery and magic”2 that could “make the worse case appear the better.”3 I ar-
gue in this Article that law students today still struggle with the beliefs underly-
ing these critiques. They seek a way to embrace the role of zealous advocate 
without abandoning their own authentic voices and convictions about what the 
law is, and while identifying and understanding their own place within the legal 
system and their conceptions of justice. Law students should—and generally 
do—understand that there can be a difference between expressing a version of 
the law that will advance their client’s interests and expressing a version of the 
law that lawyers would find likely if they were not representing the client. That 
difference may create a tension for many students, who wish to both truthfully 
express the law and also serve the client. If this difference—this tension—is not 
explicitly examined and explored early on, students may unconsciously inter-
nalize a variety of troublesome beliefs. For example, they may conclude that 
although it is possible for lawyers to understand and articulate the true meaning 
of a particular law, they must ignore this true meaning when advocating for 
their clients. Alternatively, they may conclude that there is no “true” meaning 
of law, and laws can be stretched at will to accommodate client interests. In 
both cases, their conclusions may be subconscious, and as unlikely to be con-
sciously examined as they are likely to negatively impact student beliefs about 
lawyers and lawyering. Students must be able to separate two assertions that 
are often conflated: one, that advocates should speak the truth about their topic 
(i.e., speak the truth about the law), and two, that they should advocate for a de-
sirable outcome (e.g., a just outcome, or one that benefits their client). 
Although I observe this concern with my writing students, this problem is 
not limited to the legal writing classroom, nor unique to first-year students. In-
stead, I believe this tension addresses the very nature of law and the role of 
 
1  ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 7 (W. Rhys Roberts trans., 1994). 
2  GORGIAS, THE ENCOMIUM OF HELEN 10 (Brian R. Donovan, reprt. 1999), https://faculty.be 
midjistate.edu/bdonovan/helen.html [https://perma.cc/8SVP-3JQA] [hereinafter ENCOMIUM  
OF HELEN]. 
3  JAMES A. HERRICK, THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF RHETORIC: AN INTRODUCTION 38 (4th 
ed. 2009). 
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lawyers, who articulate rules of law and express the meaning of laws as they 
represent clients. The questions raised ask us to explore what it means to be an 
advocate and whether success must come at the expense of ethics. These issues 
speak to fundamental human needs for respect, self-esteem, and self-
actualization, and are key to lawyer well-being. Students—and lawyers—who 
are able to successfully address these questions and reconcile their professional 
actions with their own values should be much more likely to escape the cyni-
cism and demoralization that permeates the legal profession. Helping law stu-
dents to think critically about their roles as lawyers and their roles in shaping 
the law should be a part of the first-year experience; we need not—and should 
not—hope that students will simply stumble upon an answer at some point in 
their education. Instead, law schools can help students thoughtfully consider 
these questions and reconcile this tension in a way that encourages critical 
thought, supports commitments to justice, and fosters well-being. 
Throughout this Article, I reflect on how students may experience law 
school. These reflections are based on my own observations and conversations 
with students about how the prevalent pedagogical methods are perceived by 
some students. My hope is that readers will be motivated to explore more deep-
ly the ways that students experience legal education and think carefully about 
how our legal education might be improved. 
Using Plato’s denunciation of rhetoric and rhetoricians as a starting point, 
Part I of this Article will explore how the first year of law school may create a 
tension between law students’ desire to advocate on behalf of their clients and 
their desire to truthfully communicate the law. I argue that the predominant So-
cratic method teaching approach of this year can implicitly reinforce a concep-
tion of law held by many new law students: that there is a correct and truthful 
law waiting to be found. Even as professors strive to suggest that law is not 
completely determinate, that good arguments for interpretation can be made on 
both sides of many issues, and that law is changed and developed over time by 
lawyers acting within the system, students may emerge with a subconscious be-
lief that (1) there is a correct view of the law, and (2) the role of lawyers is not 
to reveal it but instead argue, for the sake of argument, about plausible versions 
of the law. As a result, there is a risk that students can accept a view of lawyers 
as unethical actors in the system. By the time they proactively explore the law-
yer’s role (if they ever do), it may be too late to undo the damage, or they may 
simply move to a fully cynical view of law itself: as radically indeterminate, to 
be shaped and argued however the lawyer wishes. Accepting that view could 
contribute to cynicism and discontent in the profession that begins in law 
school but can continue into legal practice. 
Part II will explore how law school could resolve this tension with an ex-
plicit discussion of legal determinacy and the lawyer’s role in creating law. It 
will propose a framework and nomenclature for developing this aspect of pro-
fessional identity, and will address what students need to hear, when they need 
to hear it, and where that conversation might be placed within the curriculum. 
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The first step is introducing more transparency about the methods and goals of 
the Socratic method in the classroom. In contrast to the Socratic method em-
ployed by Socrates in ancient Greece, where the method served as a means to 
explore absolute truth, today’s Socratic method has dual goals of exploring the 
law and also developing the skill of making arguments on both sides of an is-
sue.4 Both goals must be explicitly revealed to students to avoid confusion. The 
second step is discussion of the lawyer’s role and identity, including the rela-
tionship between articulating an argument and expressing the “truth” about the 
law. Several role models for advocates focus primarily, or even exclusively, on 
the just outcome of a matter, and give minimal attention to the process in which 
advocates engage to reach that result, including the process of creating and ex-
pressing an interpretation of the relevant rule of law.5 Law schools should show 
students a different model of advocacy: one based in rhetoric, in which lawyers 
actively create meaning by showing various possible interpretations of the law 
in a particular social and historical context. This provides a way to act ethically 
and still advocate zealously. 
Other scholars have discussed how the first-year curriculum creates an eth-
ical disconnect for students.6 Most notably, scholarship following the Carnegie 
Report’s critique in 2007 has identified and explored professional identity for-
mation as a way to counteract law school’s weakness in the “third apprentice-
ship” of meaning and identity.7 And ethics scholars have for many years dis-
cussed the various roles that lawyers may adopt as they balance zealous 
advocacy and professional ethics obligations.8 However, relatively little has 
been said on the precise topic of this Article: tension between articulating an 
interpretation of law that is true to the law itself and advocating for an articula-
tion that benefits one’s client. This Article will strive to address that gap and 
begin a conversation about how legal educators might improve the situation, by 
adopting a framework and nomenclature for addressing this aspect of lawyer 
identity before students can unconsciously form a view of lawyers that nega-
tively impacts their well-being. 
I. THE PROBLEM: PLATO’S CRITIQUE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR TODAY’S 
 
4  See infra Section I.B. 
5  See infra Section II.A. 
6  See, e.g., WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW 4–5 (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT]. 
7  See, e.g., Larry O. Natt Gantt, II & Benjamin V. Madison, III, Self-Directedness and Pro-
fessional Formation: Connecting Two Critical Concepts in Legal Education, 14 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 498, 498 n.3 (2018); Neil Hamilton, Empirical Research on the Core Compe-
tencies Needed to Practice Law: What Do Clients, New Lawyers, and Legal Employers Tell 
Us?, 83 B. EXAMINER 6, 6, 13 (2014); see also William M. Sullivan, After Ten Years: The 
Carnegie Report and Contemporary Legal Education, 14 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 331, 337–39 
(2018) (summarizing work of Educating Tomorrow’s Lawyers, a consortium of schools 
“committed to working toward implementing the reform program outlined in the Carnegie 
Report.”). 
8  See infra Section II.A.1. 
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STUDENTS 
At first glance, looking back to fifth century BCE Athenian philosophers to 
explore problems faced by twenty-first century American law students seems 
an inauspicious approach. However, the speakers and writers of that time were 
the first teachers and scholars of rhetoric.9 Much of our current system (both for 
legal education and for forming effective arguments) is based on work begun at 
this time.10 Thus, it is only fitting to begin with views of rhetoric and advocacy 
that originated then. We can start with Plato. 
A. Plato’s Critique 
Rhetoric—“the ability to convince by means of speech”11—was a critically 
important topic to Plato and the philosophers of his era.12 At the time, a citi-
zen’s ability to persuade peers that his viewpoint should prevail was very help-
ful, even essential, to his advancement within social and political realms.13 Not 
only was active participation in politics required,14 but, should a citizen become 
 
9  See HERRICK, supra note 3, at 33–35. 
10  For example, the parts of an appellate brief follow the components and organization orig-
inated by Corax of Syracuse and modified by Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, including the 
five-part structure of introduction, statement of the case, argument summary, argument, and 
conclusion. MICHAEL H. FROST, INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC: A LOST 
HERITAGE 45 (2005). Corax developed the system after the 465 BCE revolution in Syracuse; 
he realized that instruction in the art of speaking would be critical in the new legal system, 
which required citizens to represent themselves in court. SONJA K FOSS ET AL., 
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON RHETORIC 4–5 (30th anniversary ed. 2014). 
11  The meaning of the term “rhetoric” is widely disputed, and there is no one commonly 
agreed-upon definition. Postmodern academics have defined it as “the study and practice of 
how discourse is carried on in any area whatsoever, comprehending the rules of discourse 
that obtain in any area as well as an account of how they came into being and continue to 
change.” PLATO, PHAEDRUS 2 (James H. Nichols Jr. trans., 1998) [hereinafter PHAEDRUS]. 
For the purposes of this Article, readers can use the simpler definition proposed by Plato: 
“the ability to convince.” PLATO, GORGIAS 28 (Walter Hamilton trans., rev. ed. 1971) [here-
inafter GORGIAS]. Although Plato conceived of this ability solely as used in speaking, this 
Article includes written arguments as rhetoric. 
12  See HERRICK, supra note 3, at 33–35. 
13  The use of male pronouns in this Part is deliberate and reflects the society in which Plato 
lived and worked; rarely, if at all, would a female participate in rhetorical activities. See 
CHERYL GLENN, RHETORIC RETOLD: REGENDERING THE TRADITION FROM ANTIQUITY 
THROUGH THE RENAISSANCE 20–22, 25, 27, 65–69, 110 (1997) (discussing the role of women 
in classical Greece and analyzing female rhetoricians’ work). However, free male citizens 
were entitled to fully participate in the democratic society of ancient Athens. HERRICK, supra 
note 3, at 34 (“Every free male citizen enjoyed the right of isegoria, a guarantee of equal op-
portunity to speak freely in public settings and assemblies.”). Herrick notes that “rhetorical 
education offered its students mastery of the skills of language necessary to participating in 
political life and succeeding in financial ventures” and thus “opened a new doorway to suc-
cess for many Greek citizens.” Id. at 35. 
14  In his Introduction to Gorgias, Walter Hamilton notes: 
In the small but highly developed democracy . . . , participation by all the citizens in politics 
w[ere] taken for granted; the most important issues were settled by a debate of the whole citizen 
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involved in a dispute, he would act as his own representation in a judicial pro-
ceeding.15 When Plato spoke of rhetoric, he was thinking of its practical aspects 
within political and judicial activities of the time; rhetoric was “the ability to 
convince[,] by means of speech[,] a jury in a court of justice, members of the 
Council in their Chamber, voters at a meeting of the Assembly, and any other 
gathering of citizens whatever it may be.”16 
Rhetoric’s power, as well as its importance, could hardly be overstated for 
the philosophers of Plato’s era. The art of rhetoric was considered “[t]he great-
est and best of human concerns,”17 with the potential to “lead[] . . . soul[s] 
through speeches.”18 Rhetoric gave speakers the ability not only to “speak and 
[] convince the masses” but also to make listeners their “slaves.”19 Rhetoric’s 
enormous power was considered “practically supernatural,”20 perhaps even “a 
tool of domination not generically different from outright coercion.”21 
Plato believed that such a powerful tool was susceptible to abuse, and two 
of his dialogues offer an avenue for us to understand his classical critique of 
rhetoric and advocacy.22 In Gorgias and Phaedrus, Plato attempted to show 
readers how one use of rhetoric was false and dishonorable while another was 
true and honorable.23 In Gorgias, Plato harshly criticized Sophistic orators.24 
Modern audiences might think of the Sophists as the lawyers of this time, be-
cause Sophists, much like lawyers, claimed the ability to create arguments on 
either side of any given matter and thus effectively represent either side in a 
 
body; and the method of lot which governed the appointment of many officials might at any time 
place an individual in a position of great, if temporary, prominence. 
GORGIAS, supra note 11, at 7, see also Stanley Wilcox, Isocrates’ Fellow-Rhetoricians, 66 
AM. J. PHILOLOGY 171, 175 (1945) (noting that rhetorical training was critical “as a means of 
self-protection and as an instrument for gaining political power.”). 
15  See Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of Evidence, 
44 AM. U. L. REV. 1717, 1722–23 (1995) (“In ancient Greece, citizens could not hire advo-
cates; they were required to argue their own cases in court, before large juries drawn by 
lot.”). 
16  GORGIAS, supra note 11, at 28 (452). 
17  Id. at 26 (451). 
18  PHAEDRUS, supra note 11, at 68 (261a). 
19  GORGIAS, supra note 11, at 28 (452). 
20  Id. at 34 (456).  
21  Ernest J. Weinrib, Law as Myth: Reflections on Plato’s Gorgias, 74 IOWA L. REV. 787, 
794 (1989). 
22  Plato’s dialogues are works in which he explored important issues and espoused his phil-
osophical views through fictitious conversations between Socrates and other figures of the 
day. See, e.g., GORGIAS, supra note 11, at 7; see also THE RHETORICAL TRADITION: 
READINGS FROM CLASSICAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 28–29, 52–53, 55–56 (Patricia Bizzell & 
Bruce Herzberg eds., 2d ed. 2001). 
23  See GORGIAS, supra note 11, at 28 (452), 30–31 (454), 33–35 (455–57); PHAEDRUS, supra 
note 11, at vii, 3. 
24  See GORGIAS, supra note 11, at 33–35 (455–57), 60 (473). 
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dispute.25 In Phaedrus, Plato revealed a more proper use of rhetoric than that 
employed by the Sophists: one that would not merely represent the interests of 
a particular party but would advance justice in the world.26 In these two dia-
logues, Plato created a contrast between the Sophistic use of rhetoric and the 
ethical use of rhetoric, and argued not only that the latter is objectively better 
but also that the practitioners of it will find happiness, while the practitioners of 
the former will find misery.27 
In the two dialogues, Plato made two separate assertions about rhetoricians 
(those who use rhetoric to persuade): (1) speakers should know the truth of the 
subject matter about which they speak,28 and (2) orators (the equivalent to our 
modern lawyers) should know the truth about justice and injustice (for those are 
the subjects about which they speak), and should use speech and knowledge of 
rhetoric to promote justice and benefit society.29 The distinction between these 
assertions is critical. 
1. Speakers Should Know the Truth of the Subject Matter 
Plato believed that a speaker acts wrongly when he seeks to convince an 
audience to believe something that the speaker does not know to be true. Only a 
speaker who knows truth,30 and speaks to the audience with the goal of reveal-
ing that truth, is acting correctly.31 Rhetoric that aims only to create the ap-
pearance of truth, without the reality, is to true rhetoric as an artificially created 
appearance of beauty is to good health—superficially similar but lacking in 
substance.32 
In Gorgias, Plato asserted that there is a distinction between belief and 
knowledge, and that a person may believe something without knowing it.33 
Rhetoricians cannot have the time within a single speech of advocacy34 to edu-
 
25  See HERRICK, supra note 3, at 38–39. Indeed, the Gorgias dialogue has been called “Pla-
to’s attack on lawyers and law teachers.” L.H. LaRue, Suggestions Toward Read-
ing/Teaching Plato’s Gorgias, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 317, 318 (1994). 
26  See PHAEDRUS, supra note 11, at viii, 4, 68 (261a–c). 
27  GORGIAS, supra note 11, at 56 (470). 
28  See infra Section I.A.1. 
29  See infra Section I.A.2. 
30  Plato speaks of the speech “that is written with knowledge in the soul of him who under-
stands” and “the speech of him who knows.” PHAEDRUS, supra note 11, at 87 (276a); see 
also GORGIAS, supra note 11, at 60 (473) (“[T]ruth can never be refuted.”). 
31  GORGIAS, supra note 11, at 112–13 (504) (noting that the “good orator” should “be whol-
ly concentrated on bringing righteousness and moderation and every other virtue to birth in 
the souls of his fellow-citizens, and on removing their opposites, unrighteousness and excess 
and vice.”). 
32  Id. at 47 (465) (comparing “beauty culture” to physical training). 
33  Id. at 31 (454) (“[K]nowledge and belief are clearly not the same thing.”). Plato, through 
Socrates, offers the following proof for this assertion: that one may have true and false be-
liefs, but not true and false knowledge. Thus, the two concepts must necessarily be distinct. 
34  Id. at 32 (455) (noting that the orator “could hardly teach so large a number of people 
matters of such importance in a short time.”). Here, Plato appears to assume that justice 
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cate an audience to a point of full knowledge; they must necessarily settle for 
creating a conviction of belief in their audiences, thus creating “belief without 
knowledge.”35 Plato concluded that the rhetorician “need have no knowledge of 
the truth about things; it is enough for him to have discovered a knack of con-
vincing the ignorant that he knows more than the experts.”36 
Plato found it problematic that someone who does not know the “truth” of 
a particular matter should use the power of rhetoric to persuade uneducated lis-
teners what to believe on that issue. Only a speaker who knows the truth about 
his topic should use this powerful tool.37 An honorable persuasive speaker must 
know the truth about all the particular things of which he speaks,38 or his use of 
rhetoric will be “ridiculous” and “artless.”39 If he does know the truth, howev-
er, he can persuade the audience of that truth while maintaining his own hon-
or.40 
Plato identified the expert who knows truth as one who has studied and 
learned about the subject matter to be discussed, just as the doctor is one who 
has “learnt medicine.”41 If we apply these observations to our contemporary 
lawyer, then the rhetorician—the role analogous to our contemporary lawyer 
role in this discussion—should be one who has “learned law.” In modern times, 
that is the lawyer acting as an advocate; this lawyer has studied the law general-
ly in law school and has studied the particular topic relevant to a specific case 
in order to advocate on behalf of a client for that case.42 Plato’s assertion that a 
“good” advocate must know the truth about the matter, and speak that truth of 
it, should apply to lawyers in the following way: Only advocates who know and 
speak the “truth” of the law are acting honorably; those who either know that 
 
could be taught, although in other works, such as Meno, Plato appears to question whether 
certain concepts are able to be taught. See PLATO, MENO AND OTHER DIALOGUES: 
CHARMIDES, LACHES, LYSIS, MENO 128–30 (89a–91b), 132–38 (89e–97c) (Robin Waterfield 
trans., 2005) [hereinafter MENO] (discussing whether excellence is teachable). 
35  GORGIAS, supra note 11, at 32 (454). 
36  Id. at 38 (459). Plato goes on to assert, and Gorgias to concede, that the student of rhetoric 
must “know right and wrong,” either before he begins a course of rhetorical study or through 
his completion of that course. Id. at 39 (460). 
37  PHAEDRUS, supra note 11, at 88 (277 b–c) (“Until someone knows the truth of each of the 
things that he speaks or writes about; and becomes able to define every thing [sic] in relation 
to the thing itself . . . before this he will not be able to handle with art the class of speeches 
. . . either for teaching something or for persuading something.”). 
38  See id. at 66 (259e) (“[T]he speaker’s thought[s] [must] already exist, with knowledge of 
the truth about the things that he is going to say.”). 
39  Id. at 70 (262c). 
40  Once the truth is known to the speaker, the art of rhetoric can help him to persuade others. 
RICHARD M. WEAVER, THE ETHICS OF RHETORIC 15 (1953) (noting that a rhetorician appears 
to say “I do not compel anyone to learn to speak without knowing the truth, but if my advice 
is of any value, he learns that first and then acquires me. . . . [W]ithout my help the 
knowledge of the truth does not give the art of persuasion.”). 
41  GORGIAS, supra note 11, at 39 (460). 
42  See James Boyd White, The Ethics of Argument: Plato’s Gorgias and the Modern Law-
yer, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 849, 872–73, 894 (1983) [hereinafter White, Ethics of Argument]. 
20 NEV. L.J. 1079 
1088 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:3  
the true law is something other than what they promote, or who speak without 
bothering to discover what the true law is, are acting dishonorably. 
Plato described Sophists (the group willing to argue both sides of a matter) 
as less interested in knowing and sharing truth with their audience than in 
pleasing their listeners and achieving agreement through flattery.43 For Plato, 
speakers who use rhetorical techniques to obtain assent merely by pleasing the 
audience “without drawing any distinction between better and worse pleasures 
or concerning themselves in the slightest degree with anything except the giv-
ing of gratification by any means, good or bad,” should be condemned.44 In-
stead, speakers should focus their whole concentration on benefitting their au-
diences and “on bringing righteousness and moderation and every other virtue 
to birth in the souls of [their] fellow citizens.”45 
2. Orators Should Know the Truth About Justice 
Plato also believed that orators should know the truth about matters of jus-
tice and injustice and use their rhetorical skill to promote justice. He saw no 
contradiction or conflation in suggesting that the good orator, who uses rhetoric 
when appropriate, is someone who has learnt about right and wrong46 rather 
than someone who has simply learned about the subject matter of the law. 
Quite naturally given the role of rhetoric in his time and place, he spoke mainly 
about rhetoric as it related to “power in the state, primarily about questions of 
justice and injustice.”47 Despite his assertion that a speaker should understand 
the “truth” of his subject matter, Plato’s primary directive for orators was that 
“rhetoric should always be used towards the end of justice.”48 Speakers should 
know and advocate only that which is true and in the best interests of the listen-
ers. Not only is this the ethical choice, it is also essential to speakers’ own hap-
 
43  GORGIAS, supra note 11, at 44–45 (463) (noting that rhetoric used merely to persuade lis-
teners of a particular viewpoint, without knowledge that the viewpoint was true and in the 
best interests of the listener and society “certainly isn’t a fine or honourable [sic] pursuit” but 
is a “spurious counterfeit of a branch of the art of government” which only “masquerades as 
an art”). Pleasure and good are not identical. See id. at 95–106 (495–500). For Plato, it was 
essential that the orator’s goal must be the best interests of the audience, rather than simply 
their pleasure. Id. at 126–27 (513). 
44  GORGIAS, supra note 11, at 107 (501); see also PLATO, LACHES, PROTAGORAS, MENO, 
EUTHYDEMUS 107, 109 (Protagoras 313e) (W.R.M. Lamb trans., 1924) [hereinafter LACHES, 
PROTAGORAS, MENO, EUTHYDEMUS] (warning that unless a listener has “a doctor’s 
knowledge” of one’s own soul, it is dangerous to expose oneself to the speech of a Sophist). 
45  GORGIAS, supra note 11, at 113 (504). 
46  Id. at 30–31 (454), 38–41 (459–61). 
47  White, Ethics of Argument, supra note 42, at 855. 
48  Id. at 861 (translating GORGIAS at 527); see also GORGIAS, supra note 11, at 148 (527) 
(translating the passage as “oratory is to be employed only in the service of right, and the 
same holds true of every other activity.”). 
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piness.49 Plato firmly believed that happiness was connected to upright con-
duct.50 Only when acting honorably could a speaker truly be content. 
If we apply this part of Plato’s advice, the modern advocate must assert 
justice, and work to promote the truth about right and wrong. 
The difference in thinking of an advocate as one who knows truth about 
law versus one who knows truth about justice is, for us (although perhaps not 
for Plato), a critical distinction: We can separate the ideas of knowing the sub-
ject matter (and thus the truth) of a given law and knowing the truth of right 
and wrong, justice and injustice, in terms of an ultimate outcome or course of 
action. A focus on justice is obviously relevant to contemporary legal practice; 
after all, the modern lawyer who argues for a specific outcome in a particular 
case is usually asserting that the proposed outcome is not only legally correct 
but is also the “just” outcome for that matter.51 However, it is surely possible to 
know the “truth” of the law and not know what the just outcome of a matter 
should be, or, alternatively, to not know the truth of the law but know what the 
just outcome should be. And we might easily believe that law students enter 
law school wanting to do both: truthfully articulate the law and advocate for a 
just result (or, at least, believe that the system in which they operate will lead to 
a just result).52 Even if lawyers believe the client’s desired outcome is just, 
there may be tension; advocates who are not convinced they are truthfully ar-
ticulating the law will feel ethically compromised, inauthentic, and just as dis-
content as if they were advocating for an unjust result. 
Unfortunately, the first year of law school may leave some law students 
with the impression that there is truthful law that can be identified and articu-
lated by students, but that lawyers’ focus is not to articulate that law but instead 
to assert whatever interpretation of the law will benefit their clients. This form-
ative year of law school may obscure the roles lawyers hold in making and 
 
49  GORGIAS, supra note 11, at 116–17 (507). 
50  See, e.g., id. at 56 (470) (“I maintain that men and women are happy if they are honoura-
ble [sic] and upright, but miserable if they are vicious and wicked.”); see also id. at 117 
(507) (“[W]e can win happiness only by bending all our own efforts and those of the state to 
the realization of uprightness and self-discipline.”). 
51  We might hope that the two are the same, and indeed in the posture of a lawyer arguing in 
court, one expects that the lawyer will assert that the two are identical: “[I]n every case the 
lawyer on each side must maintain that the result he or she is arguing for is both required by 
the law and itself fundamentally just.” JAMES BOYD WHITE, KEEP LAW ALIVE 95 (2019). And 
yet we know that, as James Boyd White argues, the modern lawyer is in a sense “the modern 
rhetorician in its purest form” because “the lawyer always speaks in the service of someone 
else whose interests he represents and he accordingly says not what he believes to be true or 
right about an issue he addresses, but whatever will persuade his audience to act in further-
ance of those interests.” White, Ethics of Argument, supra note 42, at 872. 
52  One might believe, as do some proponents of the “neutral partisan” role of the lawyer, 
that the lawyer need not necessarily advocate for the just result to achieve justice; the adver-
sarial system, with its opposing parties representing competing views, will allow an impartial 
judge to find and achieve that just result. See infra Section II.A.1 (discussing neutral partisan 
role). 
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shaping law; it may seem to create for students the choice between turning 
away from the role of zealous advocate for their clients or embracing that role 
at the expense of being truthful. 
B. Law School and the Socratic Method 
Law school—particularly the curriculum and pedagogical approach preva-
lent in the first year—tends to implicitly suggest to students that a “truthful 
law” exists and is discoverable. Many students come to law school, and first-
year classrooms, seeking to learn “the law” and believing that there is a specif-
ic, determinate version of the law (i.e., “truthful law”) to be found.53 Students 
may experience the Socratic method’s truth-seeking, epistemic function and 
perceive classroom activities as intended to reveal the “true,” black-letter law 
on a given topic. And yet the Socratic method, as practiced in the first-year 
classroom, also has an eristic function: of developing and exploring arguments 
on both sides of an issue as students learn to “think like lawyers.”54 These dual 
purposes, which are rarely explicitly revealed and discussed with students, may 
cause students to internalize an ethical tension about articulating “the law,” an 
uneasiness about the ethics of advocating a particular view of the law when it 
may not be the “true” law. And this tension is often not explicitly addressed, 
much less resolved, in the formative first year. 
To show how the tension develops, this Section explores the Socratic 
method as described by Plato, as introduced into law schools by Christopher 
Columbus Langdell, and as I believe it may be experienced by a significant 
number of modern law students. 
1. The Socratic Method in Plato’s Dialogues 
The method Socrates used to teach his own students had specific character-
istics: a goal (seeking truth), a process (question-and-answer), and a source (the 
student’s own soul).55 All can be observed in the quintessential example of the 
Socratic method: the conversation between Socrates and an uneducated youth, 
 
53  See James Boyd White, An Old-Fashioned View of the Nature of Law, 12 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 381, 398 (2011) [hereinafter White, Old-Fashioned] (noting that the view that 
law school will teach a specific set of rules that are “the law” is “a view that law students 
often bring to law school with them.”). 
54  See infra Section I.B.3. 
55  See William C. Heffernan, Not Socrates, but Protagoras: The Sophistic Basis of Legal 
Education, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 399, 411 (1980). Socrates himself provided no written record 
describing his method, so our understanding of it relies upon the written descriptions of his 
students, most notably Plato. See, e.g., id., at 404 (noting that “it is hard to be sure of the ac-
curacy of descriptions of the teaching methods of a man who left no writings.”); James E. 
MacDonald, Socratic Method and the Teaching of Law and Virtue, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 
19, 20–21 (1989) (arguing that it is reasonable to rely primarily on Plato’s depiction of Soc-
rates rather than that of Xenophon or Aristotle). 
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described in the Meno dialogue.56 There, Socrates set out to prove to Meno that 
“the soul is immortal and has had many previous lives; what we call learning is 
in fact the recollection of knowledge that the soul had before.”57 To demon-
strate that this must be true, Socrates asked Meno’s enslaved boy a mathemati-
cal question: If a square has sides of two feet and an area of four square feet, 
what length sides would a square have whose area was double the original?58 
The boy has no prior knowledge of the topic, and begins by offering incorrect 
answers.59 Socrates, through careful questioning (and some drawing in the 
sand), eventually leads him to the correct conclusion.60 Socrates argued that 
this means the boy had the knowledge within him all along and only needed 
questioning to draw it out and make it apparent to him.61 
Although this classic example deals with a mathematical truth, Socrates’s 
main focus in Plato’s dialogues was not mathematical truth but moral truths 
about justice and injustice, right and wrong.62 And Socrates suggested that, as 
with mathematical answers, there were absolute truths to be found for these 
questions. Through deliberate questions, truth about these weighty matters 
could be revealed, just as one might expect the scientific method to reveal 
truths about science.63 The questioner acts as a “mental midwife, the student 
being the true parent of his or her own knowledge.”64 One key aspect of the 
method was the elenchus, or refutation, whereby the teacher’s artful question-
ing showed the student that a previous statement could not be true, was incon-
 
56  See PLATO, MENO AND OTHER DIALOGUES, 112–23 (80a–85d) (Robin Waterfield trans., 
2005) [hereinafter MENO]. 
57  DOMINIC SCOTT, PLATO’S MENO 1 (2006); see also MENO, supra note 56, at 113–14 (81b–
d) (Socrates is claiming that “the human soul is immortal—that it periodically comes to an 
end (which is what is generally called ‘death’) and is born again, but that it never perishes.”). 
Plato claims that the soul has, over time, learned everything and is capable of recalling it; 
“The point is that the search, the process of learning, is . . . nothing but recollection.” Id. at 
114 (81d). 
58  See MENO, supra note 56, at 115–16 (82b–d). 
59  See id. at 116 (82e). 
60  See id. at 120–122 (84d–85c). 
61  See id. at 122–24 (85c–86b). This assertion ignores the distinction between knowledge of 
a particular fact (the answer to the specific question) and knowledge of a method (how to 
arrive at that answer). Plato’s description suggests that Socrates’s goal is to teach the answer, 
but one might argue that in fact Socrates is teaching the boy a process of problem-solving 
with respect to a particular type of problem. 
62  Heffernan, supra note 55, at 408 (“For him, question and answer were a means of awak-
ening his students to ethical truth.”); see also MacDonald, supra note 55, at 21 (discussing 
“Socrates’ preoccupation with ethical concerns”); id. at 25 (“[T]he Socratic method was al-
ways conceived as a method for discovering and teaching truth.”). 
63  Plato’s own Academy appeared to have taken a scientific approach and encouraged stu-
dents to engage in scientific study: “[T]he Academy not only dispensed knowledge, but also 
produced it.” William L. Benoit, Isocrates and Plato on Rhetoric and Rhetorical Education, 
21 RHETORIC SOC’Y Q. 60, 67 (1991). 
64  Richard K. Neumann, Jr., A Preliminary Inquiry into the Art of Critique, 40 HASTINGS 
L.J. 725, 732 (1989) [hereinafter Neumann, Art of Critique]. 
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sistent with other statements made or beliefs held by the student, and thus must 
be abandoned or modified.65 
Notably, Socrates’s method required no sources for knowledge other than 
the student’s own mind; Socrates believed that “a person’s soul contains all eth-
ical knowledge”66 and that there was no need to consult outside sources.67 
While the answers might be known to the teacher,68 the teacher’s role was not 
to impart knowledge by telling the student the correct answers.69 Instead, the 
teacher’s interaction with the student would allow the truth to come forth. 
Plato was careful to distinguish the method employed by Socrates (or at 
least, Socrates as Plato chose to portray him) from the Sophistic approach to 
discourse. In the Euthydemus dialogues, Plato provides a clear contrast between 
his Socratic method and the Sophistic style, although both utilize a similar 
question-and-answer process.70 In Euthydemus, Plato describes how the Sophist 
brothers Euthydemus and Dionsyodorus engaged in dialogue with the student 
Cleinias on the topic of learning.71 The question before them was: Who learns, 
“the wise or the foolish?”72 In playful debate, the brothers refute Cleinias’s an-
swers regardless of the position he takes.73 They are able to do so because they 
change their approach to defining “learn” depending on the position they cur-
rently argue.74 Those who are foolish (or, in some translations, ignorant) may 
 
65  Id. at 730; see also MENO, supra note 56, at 120 (84b). The resulting confusion, or feeling 
of being stuck, is known as aporia. See id. at viii (defining aporia as “having no resources,” 
“having no way to progress,” “being in an impasse,” and “being stuck”). Aporia was neces-
sary (although not enjoyable from the student’s perspective) to motivate the student to con-
tinue searching for knowledge, after realizing that the initial understanding was incorrect or 
incomplete. 
66  Donald G. Marshall, Emeritus Professor, Socratic Method and the Irreducible Core of Le-
gal Education Lecture (Jan. 19, 1994), in 90 MINN. L. REV. 1, 11 (2005) (“Teaching ethical 
truths is, therefore, simply a matter of finding the questions that were keys to unlock the soul 
and allow the student to discover knowledge he always possessed.”). 
67  See Heffernan, supra note 55, at 410–11 (noting that “Socrates was determinedly hostile 
to textual analysis of any kind” and citing Protagoras 347C as evidence that Socrates be-
lieved that “[t]he best people . . . entertain each other from their own resources . . . . It is the 
truth, and our own minds, that we should be testing.”). 
68  It is not entirely clear whether Socrates himself believed that he already knew the answers 
to his questions, or whether the process was one in which both questioner and answerer 
sought truth and discovered it together through the process. See Amy R. Mashburn, Can 
Xenophon Save the Socratic Method?, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 597, 614–15 (2008) (discuss-
ing whether Socrates claimed actual knowledge of moral truths and used his approach to 
demonstrate those truths, or “whether [his method] was used solely to illustrate the falsity of 
other beliefs.”). 
69  See Heffernan, supra note 55, at 409 (“According to Socrates, learning is a form of recol-
lection by which a student recovers from his soul knowledge he has always possessed but of 
which he was, for one reason or another, no longer consciously aware.”). 
70  See LACHES, PROTAGORAS, MENO, EUTHYDEMUS, supra note 44, at 389. 
71  See id. at 389–95. 
72  Id. at 393. 
73  Id. 
74  Id. 
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“learn” because they acquire knowledge they did not previously have;75 but 
those who are wise (and already have knowledge) may “learn” because they 
quickly gain understanding (e.g., those who are “wise” will be the ones who are 
readily able to learn a teacher’s lesson, while those who are foolish would 
struggle to understand it).76 Whichever position Cleinias takes, he ends up los-
ing the argument and appearing to contradict himself because he fails to distin-
guish between the two meanings.77 Plato contrasts this playful, bantering argu-
ment with the Socratic method, when Socrates engages in a discussion with 
Cleinias about pursuing philosophy and caring for virtue.78 The brothers’ ar-
gument only led to confusion (and laughter), while leaving Cleinias “not a whit 
the wiser as to the true state of the matters.”79 In contrast, Socrates’s approach 
leads the young man to a resolution: an answer to the question posed.80 
Euthydemus highlights an important distinction between Plato’s Socratic 
method and the Sophistic approach. For Plato, the ultimate goal was to seek 
truth, and the truth was absolute and could be recalled from the soul’s prior 
knowledge of those truths.81 Plato’s Socrates believed in truth that existed apart 
from human expression of it, a kind of divine energy.82 The method’s process 
included disputation, as the teacher posed questions and the student responded, 
often by arguing a particular point. These disputes, however, were always a 
dialectical activity; their purpose was finding and revealing truth.83 The Soph-
ists engaged in similar activities (the characteristic question-and-answer pro-
cess), but with a very different goal: For Sophists, the process was eristical ra-
ther than dialectic.84 The eristical approach views dispute as desirable in of 
 
75  See id. at 395. 
76  Id. 
77  Socrates eventually explains to the confused young man that the argument turns on the 
ambiguous nature of the word learning, which can be applied 
on the one hand to the case of a man who, having originally no knowledge about some matter, in 
course of time receives such knowledge; and on the other hand[,] the same word is applied 
when, having the knowledge already, he uses that knowledge for the investigation of the same 
matter. 
Id. at 401. 
78  See id. at 403. 
79  Id. at 401. 
80  Id. at 407. Socrates was not above using ambiguity to advance his own arguments. Re-
becca Bensen Cain argues, however, that his use of ambiguity “enables him to put forward 
the interpretation which he thinks is best,” at least in this example. REBECCA BENSEN CAIN, 
THE SOCRATIC METHOD: PLATO’S USE OF PHILOSOPHICAL DRAMA 74 (2007). Following the 
work of Francisco Gonzalez, Cain notes that Plato criticizes the brothers’ eristical approach 
less because they use ambiguity and more because their argument does not help the student 
to a greater understanding: “[T]he boy has not gained anything from the experience.” Id. at 
72. 
81  See Marshall, supra note 66, at 11. 
82  See Heffernan, supra note 55, at 408–11. 
83  Id. at 408 (“For [Socrates], question and answer were a means of awakening his students 
to ethical truth.”). 
84  See, e.g., LACHES, PROTAGORAS, MENO, EUTHYDEMUS, supra note 44, at 375. 
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itself, and does not claim that the process of proposal and disputation will nec-
essarily result in truth.85 The word “eristic” itself derives from the Greek “fond 
of wrangling,” and it carries with it nuances of “hair-splitting, disputatious, and 
specious reasoning.”86 Persuasion, in this more Sophistical view, need not be 
connected to truth.87 For the Sophists, truth was not absolute but relative;88 “ab-
solute truth was unknowable and perhaps nonexistent and had to be established 
in each case according to the perspective of the individual involved.”89 Truth 
resided in humans and was expressed (and expressible) by them.90 Not surpris-
ingly, the Sophists found ambiguous language not only acceptable but also es-
sential: “[T]he incomplete, ambiguous, and uncertain world could be interpret-
ed and understood only by means of language” and “truth and reality do not 
exist prior to language but are creations of it.”91 In contrast, for Plato (and his 
Socrates), truths were not relative but absolute; the true definitions of virtue, 
courage, or excellence would not change based on context, and when a pro-
posed definition could do so it was evidence that the definition was insuffi-
cient.92 And although the method included both eristic (refutation) characteris-
tics and epistemic (knowledge-seeking) characteristics, and this combination 
 
85  Indeed, the Merriam-Webster definition of eristic includes “characterized by disputatious 
and often subtle and specious reasoning” and “argumentative as well as logically invalid.” 
Eristic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/eristic [https://perma.cc 
/J7RR-VG3F] (last visited on Feb. 16, 2020). Somewhat unfairly, the Sophists’ use of eristi-
cal approaches has resulted in today’s understanding of “sophistic” having negative nuances, 
such as “plausible but fallacious,” Sophistic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-w 
ebster.com/dictionary/sophistic [https://perma.cc/M5XK-MQ5J] (last visited on Feb. 16,  
2020), and the term “sophist” to refer to a person who “makes good points about an issue—
until you realize those points aren’t entirely true, like a political candidate who twists an op-
ponent’s words or gives misleading facts during a speech,” Sophist, VOCABULARY.COM,  
https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/sophist [https://perma.cc/RWQ7-CQ3W] (last visit-
ed Feb. 16, 2020). 
86  MacDonald, supra note 55, at 24. 
87  See J. Christopher Rideout, Ethos, Character, and Discoursal Self in Persuasive Legal 
Writing, 21 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 19, 35 (2016) (“The Sophists, who saw the world as un-
certain and who distrusted philosophical or theological systems of knowledge, did not feel 
compelled to anchor persuasion in truth.”). 
88  For the Sophists, truth was not found from gods or Platonic universal forms but was “rela-
tive to places and cultures;” they believed that “reality itself is a linguistic construction rather 
than an objective fact.” HERRICK, supra note 3, at 41; see also MacDonald, supra note 55, at 
23 (“The Sophists, impressed with the variability of customs from place to place and time to 
time, relativized ethical concepts to given places and times.”). 
89  SONJA K. FOSS ET AL., supra note 10, at 5–6. 
90  See HERRICK, supra note 3, at 41. The Sophist Protagoras wrote “man is the measure . . . 
of all things; of things that are not, that they are not; of things that are, that they are.” Id. at 
45. 
91  SONJA K. FOSS ET AL., supra note 10, at 6. 
92  See, e.g., William Epstein, The Classical Tradition of Dialectics and American Legal Ed-
ucation, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 399, 403–04 (1981). 
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could be conflicting and confusing,93 the ultimate goal of the Socratic method 
was seeking truth rather than creating arguments.94 
2. Langdell’s Scientific Method in Law School 
In 1870, Christopher Columbus Langdell became the Dean of Harvard Law 
School and famously introduced a new method of teaching that was called “So-
cratic.”95 Although controversial at first, this method fairly quickly gained pop-
ularity and, by the beginning of the twentieth-century, was widely accepted as a 
remarkable innovation and the prevailing approach in legal education.96 As 
originally proposed, the method was similar to the original Socratic method in 
both goal and process; however, as eventually justified, it had real and signifi-
cant differences from the original Socratic method.97 
Langdell’s first goal in using this method was ostensibly the same as Soc-
rates’s: to find the truth (here, the truth of the law).98 His process was, like Soc-
rates’s, dialectical question and answer between teacher and student.99 In con-
trast to earlier forms of legal education, which encouraged apprenticeships and 
depended on lectures to transfer knowledge about the black-letter law from 
teacher to student, Langdell’s approach placed a much greater focus and em-
phasis on formal knowledge.100 Langdell believed that “[the] law [is] a sci-
 
93  Rebecca Bensen Cain argues: “One of the major drawbacks of [the Socratic method], 
from my point of view, is that the elenctic and epistemic functions are at cross-purposes. 
They have different immediate aims and follow a different set of rules for how to achieve 
that aim.” CAIN, supra note 80, at 58–59. As a result, “Socrates is playing by two sets of 
rules which come into conflict on many occasions.” Id. at 59. 
94  See Heffernan, supra note 55, at 415, 420–21. 
95  See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO 
THE 1980S 52–64 (1983); Epstein, supra note 92, at 399. 
96  STEVENS, supra note 95 at 63 (“By the beginning of the twentieth century, then, the case 
method, although far from unanimously approved, was recognized as the innovation in legal 
education.”). 
97  Both critics and proponents of the Langdellian approach tend to agree that what is cur-
rently used in law school is not a true “Socratic method.” Harris Wofford, On the Teaching 
of Law and Justice, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV 612, 614 (1978) (“The Socratic [Langdellian] method 
as so often practiced in our schools and courts is many things—it may be rigorous training in 
rhetoric, a powerful learning experience—but it is usually not Socratic. It is what Socrates 
called eristic, not dialectic. It seeks to win an argument, . . . not to achieve a synthesis or to 
reach an understanding.”). 
98  See STEVENS, supra note 95, at 53 (noting the method’s “original purpose was to isolate 
and analyze the relatively few principles of the common law that the Harvard system postu-
lated.”). 
99  See Epstein, supra note 92, at 406. 
100  Langdell’s changes arose in a climate in which 
[t]he new university education would not be about shaping the self, as the earlier American col-
lege had been. Instead, the updated university curriculum emphasized testing and criticizing be-
liefs in order to build up a body of well-established “facts” that are supported by a true under-
standing of the principles according to which things work. 
CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5. “Langdell’s new law school embraced the emphasis 
on formal knowledge by presenting law as a science in the making.” Id. 
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ence,”101 and that the principles of that science could be discovered through the 
study of judicial opinions.102 Langdell saw no need to discuss statutes103 or the 
experience of practicing law.104 With his approach, the classroom experience 
would consist of questions, posed to one or more students, about a particular 
case: What were the relevant facts? What was the procedure? What was the 
holding of the court? What was the reasoning behind that holding? And if the 
facts were slightly different—in this way or that—would that have altered the 
outcome?105 
The approach treated law as a science and, at least superficially, appeared 
to be similar to the scientific method. Like the scientific method, Langdell’s 
method begins with a starting hypothesis about a matter of interest to teacher 
and student: the student’s initial answer to the teacher’s question about a case 
or its rule of law, for example.106 Just as observation in science tests the hy-
pothesis and proves it correct or incorrect, the continued “observation” of the 
law, through repeated questions and answers, should reveal whether the stu-
dent’s initial understanding is correct or needs to be further refined.107 Not only 
is there superficial similarity between the scientific method and Langdell’s ver-
sion of the Socratic method, the comparison is quite attractive: The idea that 
“the basic questions of politics and law have answers that possess the same 
clarity and finality as the answers to mathematical questions” is truly allur-
ing.108 Under this approach, the legal system was “a unitary, self-contained, 
 
101  STEVENS, supra note 95, at 52; Edmund M. Morgan, The Case Method, 4 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
379, 379 (1952). 
102  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5 (“Judicial decisions were analyzed in a scientific 
spirit as specimens from which general principles and doctrines could be abstracted.”). 
103  See Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Osler, Langdell, and the Atelier: Three Tales of Creation 
in Professional Education, 10 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 151, 170 (2013) [hereinafter Neu-
mann, Three Tales of Creation] (noting that “[a]s a genre, casebooks are based on the idea 
that nearly all we can know about what happens in the law comes from litigation in the form 
of judicial opinions.”). 
104  Langdell also started the pattern of hiring law faculty who had no experience practicing 
law. See id. at 177–79. Langdell believed that “experience in learning law” was the only rel-
evant experience to teach the law, “not experience in the work of a lawyer’s office, not expe-
rience in dealing with men, not experience in the trial or argument of cases, not experience, 
in short, in using law.” Id. at 178–79. 
105  See Epstein, supra note 92, at 409–16. 
106  See id. at 409, 411. 
107  See MacDonald, supra note 55, at 28–29. He notes: 
One cannot resist noting the parallel between the Socratic method and Sir Karl Popper’s analysis 
of scientific method. Of course, no one would pretend that Socrates foresaw the place empirical 
observation would occupy in modern science. For Socrates the method was essentially one of 
conceptual analysis. Even so, one is hard put otherwise to discern a distinction between the in-
terplay of hypothesis and elenchus in the Socratic method and that paradigm of scientific method 
that Popper describes as “conjecture and refutation.” 
Id. 
108  Anthony T. Kronman, Robert S. Marx. Lecture: Rhetoric (Feb. 23, 1999), in 67 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 677, 683 (1999). 
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value-free, and consistent set of principles that could then be applied to each 
new case as it occurred.”109 
Like the original Socratic method and the scientific method, Langdell’s ap-
proach appeared to be dialectical. The dialectical approach proposes that truth 
can be discovered by assessing reasoned argument on the different points of 
view; thus, if one party proposes and defends a particular assertion, and the 
other party proposes and defends the competing proposition, truth should be 
ascertainable.110 This is the approach Socrates employed, and it is the approach 
Langdell suggested could be employed in the classroom to reveal the law to 
students.111 
So far, so good. But Langdell did not seek only to reveal black-letter law; 
he also intended the method to simultaneously teach the analytical skills asso-
ciated with “thinking like a lawyer.”112 And it was that goal, not the goal of 
finding “truth” of the law, that would eventually become the primary justifica-
tion for use of the Socratic method in law school classrooms.113 
To achieve that end, the classroom would not only include eristical activi-
ties alongside the dialectical ones, but it would also emphasize the eristical ac-
tivities as the point of the endeavor.114 In this sense, the law school classroom 
using a “Socratic” method would be less classically Socratic and more Sophis-
tic in its aspects.115 
In key ways, the goal of “thinking like a lawyer” leads law professors to 
encourage eristical argument as they model the process of making arguments 
on both sides of a case.116 Today’s law professors, like the Sophists, focus more 
on the game of debate itself than on the moral education or absolute truth-
 
109  STEVENS, supra note 95, at 53. 
110  Dialectic is defined as “systematic reasoning, exposition, or argument that juxtaposes 
opposed or contradictory ideas and usually seeks to resolve their conflict: a method of exam-
ining and discussing opposing ideas in order to find the truth.” Dialectic, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dialectic [https://perma.cc/9 
EMS-SPVD] (last visited Feb. 17, 2020). 
111  See Epstein, supra note 92, at 399–400. 
112  See, e.g., Neil Hamilton & Verna Monson, Legal Education’s Ethical Challenge: Empir-
ical Research on How Most Effectively to Foster Each Student’s Professional Formation 
(Professionalism), 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 325, 376 (2011) (describing the method as one  
where the instructor is shaping right doctrinal answers and analytical processes with a clear  
standard of professional excellence at the technical skills involved). 
113  See STEVENS, supra note 95, at 56 (“Although Langdell emphasized the case method as a  
means of studying rules scientifically, in practice he was the instrument of change in a dif-
ferent direction.”). 
114  See Heffernan, supra note 55, at 411. 
115  See id. at 412. Professor Heffernan makes a compelling case that today’s law professor is 
more like the Sophist Protagoras than Socrates. See id. at 418–20. 
116  See Mashburn, supra note 68, at 621 (“In classical Socratic terminology, therefore, the 
ideal law teacher assumes both the Sophist and midwife roles.”). 
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seeking that was so important to Socrates.117 Professor Heffernan, who has ar-
gued that the “Socratic method” as used in law school is more akin to the 
method of the Sophist Protagoras, noted that “[f]or Protagoras, as for law pro-
fessors, the aim of instruction is not to expose students to substantive points of 
knowledge (although this is a byproduct of their training) but instead to equip 
them with the technique by which instruction is carried out.”118 
From the outset, the dual goals of Langdell’s method caused confusion.119 
Were professors conveying information (truth about law), modeling skills (eris-
tical debate), or both, and which one should dominate? Even in Langdell’s own 
classroom, students noted that he seemed more focused on the “why” and 
“how” than the rules themselves,120 and the American Bar Association in 1891 
criticized the method for giving insufficient attention to what lawyers really 
needed to know: the law.121 Despite Langdell’s self-proclaimed belief that “law 
is a science, and that all the available materials of that science are contained in 
the printed books,”122 those who promoted the approach increasingly did so be-
cause of its ability to teach students how to think like a lawyer.123 
This is partially true because Langdell’s proposal that law could be treated 
as a science, which was met with skepticism at its introduction, had even less 
support within the legal academy by the end of the twentieth century.124 The 
Legal Realism movement of the 1930s shifted the American legal system’s ap-
proach away from a formalistic view of law as true science and towards legal 
realism.125 Legal realism “takes the notion of law as a prediction of what hu-
man officials will do, more than as an existent, objective, determinable limit or 
boundary on client behavior.”126 By the 1970s, the legal academy had rejected 
the premise of law-as-science.127 
 
117  See Heffernan, supra note 55, at 412 (noting that “law professors are not permitted to use 
their classrooms to carry out direct moral instruction of their students”); Neumann, Art of 
Critique, supra note 64, at 729. 
Protagoras taught students how to develop equally plausible arguments both for and against a 
given proposition by proving and then refuting each conceivable position, all in order to be able, 
as advocates, “to make the weaker cause the . . . stronger.” Socrates scorned all of this as the 
teaching of manipulation, rather than analysis and self-knowledge. 
Id. 
118  Heffernan, supra note 55, at 420. 
119  See STEVENS, supra note 95, at 53. 
120  See id. at 55. 
121  See id. at 58. 
122  Id. at 53 (quoting Langdell’s speech published in the English Law Quarterly Review in 
1887). 
123  Id. at 55–56. 
124  See id. at 156. 
125  Id. (noting that the Realist movement “kill[ed] the Langdellian notion of law as an exact 
science”). 
126  Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some 
Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 625 (1986). Perhaps the clearest description 
of pure legal realism is Llewellyn’s well-known statement: “What . . . officials do about dis-
putes is, to my mind, the law itself.” KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR 
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This shift might have cast doubt upon the Socratic method’s utility in law 
school: Legal truths were not absolute as Plato’s had been, but mutable over 
time and subject to varying interpretations. For that reason, the legal academy 
might have moved away from the method, choosing some other way to teach 
“thinking like a lawyer” without the overtones of truth-seeking. But despite the 
demise of law-as-science as a core principle, the method lived on: Its support-
ers argued that the method’s true genius was not necessarily its truth-finding 
function, but its ability to promote analytical thought that would allow lawyers 
to predict what courts would do.128 In that sense, the question-and-answer pro-
cess could provide an active learning approach to discovering the law of a par-
ticular line of cases or of specific lines of doctrine. Proponents believed that if 
presented well, the method exposed students not only to doctrines of a particu-
lar area but also to typical problems in that field; it then could encourage them 
to analyze the problems and the law themselves rather than passively accepting 
the description of the law as stated in lecture format by a professor.129 The ac-
tive engagement of the student (either specifically, in conversation with the 
professor, or vicariously, by following the conversation of a fellow classmate 
with the professor) would ensure a more thorough understanding, and would 
allow the student to practice the analytical approaches of judicial decision-
makers.130 Thus, the method persevered and retained strong defenders.131 To-
day, it “remains the law’s signature pedagog[y]”132 and continues to be the ap-
proach that is used “almost exclusively in the first phase of doctrinal instruc-
tion.”133 
 
LAW AND ITS STUDY 12–13 (2012). We might also consider the words of Justice Holmes, 
who noted that “[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more preten-
tious, are what I mean by the law.” Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. 
REV. 457, 461 (1897). 
127  See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 247, 249 (1978) (stating that “[t]he primitive conception that in some way men 
can arrive at true propositions and by reasoning logically from these premises arrive at new 
legal truths or specific decisions by deduction alone[] is a false and mischievous way of 
looking at the legal universe.”). To be sure, legal realism did not win the day completely; 
there are plenty of critiques of pure realism. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: 
AN ETHICAL STUDY, 20–24 (1988) (hereinafter LAWYERS AND JUSTICE). But few would deny 
that this view has had a profound influence on the American legal system and has a firm 
hold in today’s legal education. 
128  See STEVENS, supra note 95, at 269 (noting that in the post-1945 era of legal education, 
“most legal educators and practitioners regarded it as an unparalleled method for training 
students to be lawyers.”). 
129  See Morgan, supra note 101, at 384. 
130  Id.; see also Epstein, supra note 92, at 416–18. 
131  See Elizabeth G. Porter, The Socratic Method, in BUILDING ON BEST PRACTICES: 
TRANSFORMING LEGAL EDUCATION IN A CHANGING WORLD 101, 102 (Deborah Maranville et 
al. eds., 2015) (arguing that the method has been undervalued and “is an easily scalable, ef-
fective, deeply engaging way to achieve active student learning”). 
132  Id. at 101. 
133  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 6, at 50. 
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3. Critiquing the Method: Risks for Today’s Students 
Despite its success, many scholars have criticized the Socratic method’s 
use in law school.134 In 2007, the Carnegie Foundation’s Report on legal educa-
tion asserted that the method, although it might be effective in training students 
to “think like lawyers,” prevented students from integrating ethical and moral 
values into their understanding of lawyering.135 By placing matters of justice 
“secondary to formal correctness,”136 the method obscures the ethical aspects of 
lawyering and results in a “loss of orientation and meaning” for law students.137 
The Carnegie Report identified a “hidden curriculum” within law school, one 
that both “shapes, [and] misshapes, [legal] education,” consisting of lessons 
that were never explicitly expressed yet nonetheless were effectively received 
by the students.138 
 
134  See, e.g., Michael Vitiello, Professor Kingsfield: The Most Misunderstood Character in 
Literature, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 958–70 (2005). In the 1970s and 1980s, detractors 
made a variety of allegations: It was psychologically harsh to students, discriminatory to fe-
males, ineffective in conveying practical skills, and more. Id. at 973–87 (discussing and ar-
guing against several leading critiques of the method as used in law school); see also Benja-
min V. Madison, III, The Elephant in Law School Classrooms: Overuse of the Socratic 
Method as an Obstacle to Teaching Modern Law Students, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 293, 
294–95, 303–09 (2008) (arguing for an overhaul of the legal education system through diver-
sifying its teaching methods). More recently, the method has been described as “out of fash-
ion among those who write about legal pedagogy.” Porter, supra note 131, at 101–02 (dis-
cussing critiques of method and defending method against these critiques). 
135  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 6, at 57. The Carnegie Report suggested that the method 
downplayed justice and “force[s] students to separate their sense of justice and fairness from 
their understanding of the requirements of legal procedure and doctrine.” Id. While the Re-
port conceded that the case-dialogue method was capable of “encompass[ing] distinctions 
between moral and legal issues,” it ultimately concluded that, as used in the classroom, it did 
not do so. Id. at 59 (noting that “neither the typical course nor the case book used ventures to 
raise the question.”). 
136  Id. at 58. 
In order to gain facility in legal reasoning, case-dialogue teaching often forces students to sepa-
rate their sense of justice and fairness from their understanding of the requirements of legal pro-
cedure and doctrine. Matters concerning the “equities” of a situation may be aired in class dis-
cussion, but almost always as second thoughts about “policy.” 
Id. at 57. 
137  Id. at 7. Around the same time as the Carnegie Report, another study of best practices in 
law school pedagogy argued that the method was overused in law schools. See ROY 
STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION 102–04 (2007) (concluding that the 
Socratic method is pedagogically ineffective and that teachers’ use and abuse of it can psy-
chologically damage students’ “sense[s] of self-worth, security, authenticity, and compe-
tence”). And Elizabeth Mertz, a lawyer-anthropologist, conducted a comprehensive study of 
law school classrooms and released a linguistic study of the “language of law school,” which 
blamed the method for students experiencing a “linguistic rupture, a change in how they 
view and use language.” ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO 
“THINK LIKE A LAWYER” 22 (2007). 
138  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 6, at 31–32. Mertz’s study made similar conclusions, stat-
ing that law school encourages students to “los[e] touch with some fundamental aspects of 
what brought [them] to law school in the first place: concerns with justice, fairness, or help-
ing people.” MERTZ, supra note 137, at 11. Mertz also noted the connection between this dis-
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In this Article, I suggest the extensive use of the Socratic method in the 
first year of law school creates the risk of providing another “hidden curricu-
lum” lesson; some students will receive a lesson about what it means to be an 
advocate and express the meaning of a given law as it applied to a set of client 
facts. As students simultaneously experience the epistemic, truth-seeking func-
tion of the method and the eristic, disputation activities of it, they may internal-
ize the idea that legal truth exists and is discoverable, but that the role of law-
yers is not to speak that truth; instead, a lawyer’s role is to identify arguments 
on either side as the Sophists did, disregarding the actual truth of the matter. 
Like the hidden lesson identified by the Carnegie Report, in which students ex-
perience a disconnect between their sense of justice and the formal lessons of 
the law, this lesson has negative implications for student well-being and ethical 
identity because it creates a tension between students’ ideas of what the law is 
and their ideas of what they must say the law is to serve their clients. The ten-
sion arises in part from student expectations upon entering law school and the 
challenge of accepting law school’s threshold concept of the malleability of 
law. It is exacerbated when professors employ the Socratic method without ex-
plicitly acknowledging the method’s dual (and sometimes conflicting) goals. 
Law students may come to law school expecting to learn “the law,” believ-
ing that lawyers are distinguished from laypeople because of their knowledge 
of laws.139 The idea that the law is not an established set of rules “may be coun-
ter-intuitive, alien, or even objectionable.”140 As James Boyd White notes: 
This is a view that law students often bring to law school with them. They ex-
pect that we shall teach them a set of rules. These are the rules they will apply as 
lawyers, and knowledge of them is what sets them apart from the non-lawyer, to 
whom they are unknown. A large part of a good legal education is disabusing 
them of this view.141 
Moving away from that view, however, to a more nuanced view of law, is 
not as easy as it sounds. Melissa Weresh has persuasively argued that the mal-
leability of law is a “threshold concept” in legal education: a concept that caus-
es a “cognitive shift in the [learner’s] thinking process.”142 Such concepts are 
characterized, in part, by being both troublesome and transformative; they are 
 
connect and psychological distress. See id. at 27 (reporting on psychiatrist Alan Stone’s re-
view of the method, which found it could negatively impact “students’ interpersonal rela-
tions and sense of self-esteem, a theme echoed in current studies of psychological distress 
among law students.”). 
139  See White, Old-Fashioned, supra note 53, at 398. Of course, law students come to law 
school for many other reasons as well, and surely not all of them would endorse the view 
that the law might be a fixed set of rules. Still, it seems uncontroversial to maintain that one 
reason students enter law school is to learn “the law,” and that many students have not given 
serious thought to the law other than as a set of rules. 
140  Melissa H. Weresh, Stargate: Malleability as a Threshold Concept in Legal Education, 
63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 689, 711 (2014). 
141  White, Old-Fashioned, supra note 53, at 398. 
142  Weresh, supra note 140, at 689–90. 
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difficult to master, but, once accepted, mark an irreversible shift in the way one 
views the world and the discipline.143 Such a shift does not come easily. 
The dual goals of the Socratic method in the law school classroom may ex-
acerbate the challenge that students face in accepting this threshold concept. 
“The challenge of any pedagogy is to make the invisible visible, both in the 
mind of the teacher and the mind of the learner.”144 Unfortunately, the Socratic 
method makes it all too possible for the invisible to remain invisible. Here, the 
invisible suggestion is that the law is not created and shaped by people but in-
stead exists as an already-formed, unchanging truth just waiting to be discov-
ered and shared.145 The epistemic, truth-seeking function of the method encour-
ages rather than discourages a view that there is a true law that may be 
discovered and applied. While the method may expose students to the ideas that 
there are “good arguments on both sides,”146 it also reinforces the idea that it is 
the better argument that prevails and is “correct” in some absolute sense. Eliza-
beth Mertz asserts that it is an “obvious and ubiquitous feature of Socratic 
method teaching” to insist on “a dialogic or argumentative form from which, 
eventually, legal truth emerges.”147 There is, after all, usually a “right” doctri-
nal answer about what the current state of the law is, and that “legal truth,” to 
the students, is almost certainly black-letter law revealed by the appellate 
courts’ decisions. As the students engage in the question-and-answer of the 
method, they are constantly searching for the “right” answer: the doctrinal law 
that they eventually glean from class discussion of the opinions (or, failing that, 
will obtain from commercial outlines and guides). That black-letter law is in 
turn the information that the students are rewarded for knowing and using on 
their all-important final exams. One popular critique of the case dialogue meth-
od is that it “hides the ball” and that the method is undesirable because students 
“don’t learn the material effectively from the Socratic method.”148 This critique 
 
143  See id. at 694–95. 
144  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 6, at 59. 
145  See MERTZ, supra note 137, at 59. 
146  See Morgan, supra note 101, at 384. 
147  MERTZ, supra note 137, at 59. She goes on to note: 
This has some very obvious parallels with courtroom discourse and with the U.S. legal system’s 
overall dependence on procedure as a guarantor of justice. (As long as both parties get their day 
in court, represented by attorneys who will engage in vigorous linguistic combat on their behalf, 
justice is done)[.] The classic Socratic dialogue in law teaching, then, both indexes and mirrors a 
core legal model not only of how knowledge or truth is obtained but also of how justice is 
achieved. 
Id. 
148  Brian Leiter, The “Socratic Method”: The Scandal of American Legal Education, LEITER 
REP.: A PHILOSOPHY BLOG (Oct. 20, 2003, 12:15 PM), https://leiterreports.typepad.com/bl 
og/2003/10/the_socratic_me.html [https://perma.cc/LTM9-7C7D] (“If the Socratic method  
were really an effective way to teach students law, why would almost all law students (in-
cluding the very best ones) turn to commercial outlines?”). 
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reveals students’ perception that the purpose of the Socratic method in law 
school is to provide them with knowledge of true law.149 
A student who focuses on the epistemic aspects of the Socratic method 
“can reduce the course to the black-letter law, either through hornbook or the 
more laborious method of reading the cases; the teacher cannot prevent it, and 
his examination in any event seems to ask for nothing that a bright student can-
not provide on the basis of hornbook reading.”150 The sources for first-year 
classes do little or nothing to contradict this view; first-year mandatory classes 
have not changed much from the requirements of the Langdellian era and “re-
flect[] a nineteenth-century view of law and how it’s made.”151 Casebooks of-
ten provide minimal, if any, context about the historical or social considerations 
at the time the opinion was issued; whether the class includes any coverage of 
those considerations, or any discussion of how the laws change over time, de-
pends almost entirely on the inclinations (and the time constraints) of the pro-
fessor.152 The case dialogue method relies on “highly redacted accounts of legal 
proceedings that render fact-patterns in condensed formulas.”153 The Carnegie 
Report asserted that using these redacted accounts “can give the misleading 
impression that facts are typically easy to ‘discover,’ rather than resulting from 
complex processes of interpretation that are shaped by pressures of litiga-
tion.”154 Similarly, the method’s reliance on judicial opinions also suggests that 
the law is like those facts: it, too, exists within nature.155 In the first year, dis-
cussions about where the law comes from, how it develops, and who develops 
it may be brief, early, and easily forgotten: a lecture during Orientation, per-
 
149  And that knowledge is required not only for first year exams but also to pass the bar ex-
am; thus, the message that a “correct” law exists is both introduced in the first year and rein-
forced later in legal education. 
150  James Boyd White, Doctrine in a Vacuum: Reflections on What a Law School Ought 
(and Ought Not) to Be, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155, 159 (1986) [hereinafter White, Doctrine in a 
Vacuum]. 
151  Neumann, Three Tales of Creation, supra note 103, at 172 (noting that the curriculum 
established by Langdell is “remarkably close to the required curriculum at most law schools 
today”). Evidence has often moved to second year, Legal Writing has been added, and Pro-
fessional Responsibility is required at some point. These changes aside, the standard first-
year experience seems close to what Langdell proposed for Harvard in the 1871–72 academ-
ic year. Id. 
152  Deborah L. Rhode notes that “The standard casebook approach offers no sense of how 
problems unfolded for the lawyers or ultimately affected the parties. Nor does it adequately 
situate formal doctrine in social, historical, and political context.” DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN 
THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 198 (2000) [hereinafter 
INTERESTS OF JUSTICE]. 
153  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 6, at 53. Like the Sophists, today’s law professors focus 
on textual analysis, rather than on the person’s soul, for the acquisition of knowledge. See 
Heffernan, supra note 55, at 418–20. 
154  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 6, at 53. 
155  Law students may miss the “performative character” of legal texts. See MERTZ, supra 
note 137, at 60. 
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haps, or the first few class sessions in Civil Procedure.156 Because the majority 
of the students’ time is dedicated to reading case law and extracting from it the 
law of the case, without reference to who created the law or how, law school 
tends to obscure and minimize the role that people, including lawyers, play in 
creating the rules that are eventually adopted by the court.157 
Students experience a high cognitive load in law school, working at high 
levels of Bloom’s Taxonomy;158 they are asked not only to understand and re-
tain content, but to learn and apply new analytical skills, and then to apply both 
the content and the skills to new factual scenarios. This poses significant chal-
lenges to their information processing abilities.159 Many students will try to 
minimize cognitive strain as much as possible by focusing only on what ap-
pears to be absolutely necessary: learning “rules of law and substantive poli-
cies.”160 
 
156  Civil Procedure courses often begin by tracing the development of personal jurisdiction 
over several decades. This affords an opportunity for the professor to show (at least implicit-
ly, and often explicitly) how historical, economic, and social considerations influenced the 
development of the rules. See, e.g., RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS (7th ed. 2016) (covering personal jurisdic-
tion in the second chapter); LINDA J. SILBERMAN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE (2d ed. 2006) (same); A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A 
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH (3d ed. 2011) (same); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 
(7th ed. 2008) (same). 
157  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 6, at 57 (noting that “the typical form in which the case 
books present cases may even suggest something misleading about the roles lawyers play, 
more often casting them as distanced planners or observers than as interacting participants in 
legal actions.”); see also Cramton, supra note 127, at 255 (“In individual courses, and in the 
law curriculum as a whole[,] the dominant emphasis is on lawyers as appliers of law rather 
than as creators of law.”). Mertz notes that the case-dialogue method also obscures the role 
of clients. See MERTZ, supra note 137, at 13 (“[W]ritten case law and legislation do little to 
capture the overall shape of legal interventions in our lives.”); RICHARD J. WILSON, THE 
GLOBAL EVOLUTION OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION: MORE THAN A METHOD 135 (2018) 
(noting that the method involves “ ‘doing’ only a small element of what a lawyer does, and 
that doing is without any human contact or interaction at all. . . . [I]f there is an element of 
doing, it is in the library, not in life lived by clients.”). 
158  Bloom’s Taxonomy was initially developed by a committee led by educational psy-
chologist Dr. Benjamin Bloom in 1956 and was revised by a group of cognitive psycholo-
gists in 2001. It categorizes different levels of learning, from easier to harder: remembering, 
understanding, applying, analyzing, evaluating, and creating. See Patricia Armstrong, 
Bloom’s Taxonomy, VAND. U.: CTR. FOR TEACHING, https://cft.vanderbilt.edu/guides-sub-pa 
ges/blooms-taxonomy/ [https://perma.cc/6VXW-SKUM] (last visited Feb. 16, 2020) (sum-
marizing original taxonomy and revised version). 
159  See Madison, supra note 134, at 309–10. 
160  David P. Bryden, What Do Law Students Learn? A Pilot Study, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 479, 
504 (1984). This is not because students are lazy—or, at least, not any lazier than people 
generally. Mental activity involving complex problems is characterized by “laziness, a reluc-
tance to invest more effort than is strictly necessary.” DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST 
AND SLOW 31 (2011). Humans generally will wish to avoid working more than necessary, 
and thinking is hard work. One cognitive scientist has argued that “[h]umans don’t think 
very often because our brains are designed not for thought but for the avoidance of thought.” 
DANIEL T. WILLINGHAM, WHY DON’T STUDENTS LIKE SCHOOL?: A COGNITIVE SCIENTIST 
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Thus, the epistemic aspects of the method might lead students to think that, 
just as a medical student might uncover the kidney through dissection in a 
Gross Anatomy class, and then explore the dimensions of that organ, a law stu-
dent could uncover the rule of offer and acceptance through Socratic dialogue 
in a Contracts class, then explore the dimensions of that doctrine as an object of 
nature, existing without reference to the human influence in shaping or chang-
ing it. Dissecting judicial opinions to extract and discuss rules of law seems ep-
istemic to the students: a search for the correct answer, a sense that the law is 
determinate. 
At the same time as they absorb the epistemic aspects of the method, law 
students are exposed to its eristical aspects.161 These are intended to encourage 
“thinking like a lawyer” and involve creating and exploring a variety of plausi-
ble interpretations of a rule of law.162 This part of the classroom experience 
might suggest that the law is indeterminate: that a plausible argument can be 
created for virtually any position. Lawyers appear to behave, not as if the law is 
a kidney, but as King Louis XII of France accused, as if it is shoe leather. 
“Lawyers use the law as shoemakers use leather; rubbing it, pressing it, stretch-
ing it with their teeth, all to the end of making it fit their purposes.”163 Or to 
borrow from Humpty Dumpty, as if “[w]hen I use a word, . . . it means just 
what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”164 Substitute “law” for 
“word,” and you may get a sense of what it feels like for a novice to experience 
the eristical aspects of the Socratic method. 
Despite the tension between the dual aspects of the method, a law professor 
may not choose to engage in, or even see the need for, a discussion of the po-
tential conflict, because the professor may not immediately or instinctively see 
the problem created. Professors, legal experts, and scholars, who have long un-
derstood the concept of malleability or determinacy within the law, may fail to 
see the possibility of confusion for novice students, because the epistemic and 
eristic aspects of the method do not seem contradictory to them.165 There is, af-
 
ANSWERS QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW THE MIND WORKS AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR YOUR 
CLASSROOM 4 (2009). 
161  Given the dual goals of the classroom, the professor is forced to engage in activities that 
use the dialectical, question-and-answer approach of the classic Socratic method both to re-
veal the black-letter law and simultaneously to model the eristical process of making argu-
ments on both sides of a case. See Mashburn, supra note 68, at 620–21. 
162  See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 92, at 417–19. 
163  W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW 69 (2010) [hereinafter FIDELITY 
TO LAW]. 
164  LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 124 
(1872). 
165  Perhaps this is due to what cognitive psychologists call the “curse of knowledge,” which 
is the metacognitive error that occurs because humans experience great “difficulty in imagin-
ing what it is like for someone else not to know something that you know.” STEVEN PINKER, 
THE SENSE OF STYLE 59 (2014); see also PETER C. BROWN ET AL., MAKE IT STICK: THE 
SCIENCE OF SUCCESSFUL LEARNING 115 (2014) (defining the curse as “our tendency to un-
derestimate how long it will take another person to learn something new or perform a task 
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ter all, a truth-seeking function in the classroom: the courses are designed to 
teach what “the law” is, and lawyers can and do “find” the law as it has been 
interpreted and applied by parsing through judicial opinions, identifying rules, 
and synthesizing various cases into a legal rule capable of application to future 
client facts. Doctrinal professors do in this sense teach the truth about the 
law,166 although perhaps not truth in an absolute sense: not what we might call 
“noble truth” about the nature of justice itself, or what goals one should pursue 
in life.167 But certainly professors do seek to reveal more mundane truths about 
the law: what is the correct understanding of a particular common law concept, 
or an accurate interpretation of a statutory term or phase.168 
And yet, of course, professors understand the law is not a kidney; we have 
moved far away from Langdell’s formalistic approach (if it even existed in pure 
form during Langdell’s time).169 On the other extreme, neither is the law shoe 
leather; it is not “radically indeterminant,” as W. Bradley Wendel notes, or “at 
least no sensible participant in the legal system acts as if the law is radically in-
determinate.”170 The process of finding—and articulating—what the law may 
mean in different situations and different times is the job of lawyers, and their 
work changes and creates law over time.171 
Professorial expertise does not ensure that the professors will recognize the 
gap between what they know and what the students know, nor does it ensure 
that they will address the challenges faced by students in this area. Expertise 
 
that we have already mastered.”); HOW PEOPLE LEARN: BRAIN, MIND, EXPERIENCE, AND 
SCHOOL 44 (John D. Bransford et al. eds., expanded ed. 2000) [hereinafter HOW PEOPLE 
LEARN] (“In fact, expertise can sometimes hurt teaching because many experts forget what is 
easy and what is difficult for students.”). 
166  See Epstein, supra note 92, at 406 n.9 (“Though decried by most legal educators, truth 
seeking in legal education, and in law for that matter, refuses to die.”).  
167  Professors, like Sophists in classical time, may see their roles as teaching arguments or 
speech and not moral education. See, e.g., MacDonald, supra note 55, at 25 (noting Sophists’ 
goal “was not the scientific one of discovering the truth, but the practical one of teaching.”). 
Like the Sophists, law professors tend to “remain[] value-neutral while showing their stu-
dents how to influence the courts on questions of right and wrong.” Heffernan, supra note 
55, at 415–16. 
168  Mertz observes that there may be no right answers in law school, but there are certainly 
wrong ones. MERTZ, supra note 137, at 63. Students might assert that their classroom experi-
ence demonstrates that there are indeed “right” doctrinal answers. 
169  The Carnegie Report noted that law “is quite unlike the physical or biological systems 
underlying engineering or medicine, which can be adequately described in abstraction from 
intention and purpose” but “this cultural and ethical aspect of the law receives far less atten-
tion in the critical first year than its formal, analytical features.” CARNEGIE REPORT, supra 
note 6, at 84. Similarly, James Boyd White points out that it is “simply impossible . . . that 
the law is a system or scheme of rules that are in practice applied more or less rationally to 
produce a set of intended or desired results.” White, Old-Fashioned, supra note 53, at 398. 
170  FIDELITY TO LAW, supra note 163, at 14. 
171  See, e.g., Michael J. Cedrone, The Developmental Path of the Lawyer, 41 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 779, 825 (2013) (“Stated differently, lawyers generate law, they do not merely research 
and repeat it.”). 
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does not guarantee effective teaching.172 And although professors are experts in 
their field and in analytical skills, they may not be experts in the area of peda-
gogy.173 For the most part, law professors come to the classroom having re-
ceived no training in the Socratic method or its effective application other than 
experiencing it for themselves in their own legal education.174 The structure of 
the legal academy may also discourage, rather than encourage, professors from 
pursuing additional training in pedagogy.175 As a result, many professors who 
employ some version of the Socratic method may not have thought deeply 
about how the activities of the method may be perceived by the students. And 
some defenders of the “classic” version of the Socratic method assert that effec-
tive use of the method requires hiding the underlying methodology from the 
students.176 
The combination of these factors creates a gap between students and pro-
fessors in understanding and experience. The professors are fully aware that 
there is not an absolute law handed down from on high to find; this concept, all 
too clear to them, feels unnecessary to explicitly divulge to the students. To the 
professors, for example, the almost-exclusive reliance on judicial opinions as 
sources is not problematic; the professors understand that the judicial opinion is 
unique amongst texts, because it not only expresses the law but also creates 
it.177 But to the student, a focus on reading the texts to extract and observe the 
law can easily miss the fact that the text—and its author—is creating the law, 
 
172  Many experts in an area are ineffective in teaching it, because it is difficult for them to 
remember what it was like not to know what they now know, and to create the foundation 
and steps for others that they created for themselves as they learned. See HOW PEOPLE 
LEARN, supra note 165, at 44. 
173  See, e.g., INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 152, at 196 (“We do not effectively educate 
legal educators.”). 
174  See, e.g., Patricia Cranton & Ellen Carusetta, Perspectives on Authenticity in Teaching, 
55 ADULT EDUC. Q. 5, 7 (2004) (“Most new faculty receive no formal teacher training; they 
uncritically absorb techniques, strategies, and styles from their own prior experiences as stu-
dents and from their colleagues and the norms of the academic community.”); see also 
Melissa J. Marlow, Does Kingsfield Live?: Teaching with Authenticity in Today’s Law 
Schools, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 229, 234–35 (2015). 
175  See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 58–61 (2012) (arguing that professors 
are encouraged to pursue scholarship rather than teaching). Certainly, the structure of law 
school does not necessarily support an emphasis on pedagogy, although many law schools 
and many professors passionately believe in the value of good pedagogy. Promotion and 
tenure decisions often rest on production and placement of scholarship, which can be easily 
measured and assessed. Teaching is more difficult to measure; it often occurs within a “black 
box” of the classroom, seen only by the teacher and students themselves, and often assessed 
primarily, or even exclusively, by student evaluations. One can hardly be surprised if strate-
gic tenure-track professors choose to devote more time and attention to scholarship than to 
pedagogy; indeed, from an economic standpoint, they would be foolish not to prioritize in 
that way. 
176  See, e.g., Mashburn, supra note 68, at 619–20. 
177  Legal texts have a “performative” character. “[T]hey report on a decision made by the 
judge or judges, but at the same time the texts themselves actually are the decisions: the 
words of the texts constitute or ‘perform’ the decisions.” MERTZ, supra note 137, at 60. 
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and that this act of creation followed from a lawyer’s articulation of the law’s 
meaning.178 
Professors face a considerable challenge in the Socratic method classroom, 
in which their “students, anxious to learn the ‘meaning’ of words of phrases, 
strive mightily to find the answer that can be valid in all contexts, [and] the 
teacher must show that meaning shifts continuously with changing contexts, 
that words have shifting components of meanings.”179 In doing so, the teachers 
often “ignore the fact that their students simply do not understand the purposes 
and justifications for the Socratic method,” and “fail to recognize how pro-
foundly this lack of understanding alters its effectiveness.”180 It should not sur-
prise us that use of the method, without an explicit discussion of its purpose 
and limitations, creates a real danger “that the ‘game’ played well will seem re-
al, obscuring the approach’s manipulability and its vulnerability to objective 
reality.”181 
Thus, the hidden curriculum behind the Socratic method in law school im-
plicitly suggests to students that there is a true law, a right answer to a legal 
question, but that lawyers themselves are not focused solely on finding and 
speaking it but instead on articulating plausible arguments for opposite out-
comes. As practiced within law school, the method has both Socratic and So-
phistic aspects to its approach, and employs both the epistemic function of re-
vealing truth and the eristic function of game playing with arguments.182 
 
178  As Professor Merritt has noted, ideal pedagogical goals of the model include showing 
that the law develops over time through judicial interpretation and preparing students to ad-
vocate for changes in the law. See Deborah J. Merritt, The Strange Case of the Case Method, 
LAW SCH. CAFE (June 29, 2018), https://www.lawschoolcafe.org/2018/06/29/the-strange-ca 
se-of-the-case-method/ [https://perma.cc/W6ZA-XUPK] (asserting that although method  
theoretically achieves “at least five pedagogic goals” including showing that law develops  
over time and through judicial interpretation and preparing “students to advocate for changes  
in the law,” the method “has been quietly subverted to accomplish primarily the [] goal [of] 
instructing students on doctrinal principles”). Merritt argues that only a small group of stu-
dents will accomplish all five goals. Id. 
179  Epstein, supra note 92, at 417; see also Julie M. Spanbauer, Teaching First-Semester 
Students that Objective Analysis Persuades, 5 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 167, 175 (1999) 
(“Given this combination of factors, it is no wonder that the first-semester student, as novice 
legal thinker, is often seduced into a search for the right answer.”). Viewing malleability of 
law as a “threshold concept” reminds us that such concepts are unfamiliar, troublesome, and 
threatening to the novice. See Weresh, supra note 140, at 694, 711. 
180  Mashburn, supra note 68, at 642. 
181  Steven Alan Childress, The Baby and the Bathwater: Salvaging a Positive Socratic 
Method, 7 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 333, 339 (1982) (“The professor can guard against this 
impression by a candid and self-conscious examination of the ‘game’ itself.”); see also Mor-
gan, supra note 101, at 385 (noting that only after students have “become accustomed to this 
process and ha[ve] acquired a sufficient background in the fundamental subjects of the first 
year” will they be able to understand the complexities of the case: whether it was argued 
well or poorly on one or both sides; whether facts were omitted or disallowed from evidence; 
whether the outcome was based on an erroneous view of the law). 
182  See Heffernan, supra note 55, at 408–09, 414. While it might be possible to use Socratic 
method to teach the art of analysis to law students, see Neumann, Art of Critique, supra note 
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Professors in my position can observe that some students accept, perhaps at a 
subconscious level, that the truth-seeking epistemic function reveals the truthful 
law itself, that their education provides them with the rules, and that those rules 
are to be revered and respected. The eristic disputation role in the classroom—
the bandying about of different positions and articulations—is but an academic 
game that leads to the ultimate resolution (by the appellate court) of what the 
law is, and to the revelation that the lawyer on the losing side was wrong and 
misguided.183 Professors may speculate that many (or even most) students 
know, or at least suspect, that the law cannot mean everything and anything; it 
cannot be that the law can be manipulated to support any and every assertion. 
And they know, or at least suspect, that the law is not static and absolute. But to 
what degree is the law mutable? And who has authority to articulate competing 
visions of it? “The law,” at least for some students, seems to be both objective 
and subjective, absolute and completely nebulous, and their own role with re-
spect to its creation and articulation—speaking it into existence—may be un-
clear. The fact that within the litigation process each lawyer tries to persuade 
the jury of her side is not evidence that there is no truth but evidence that the 
lawyer is indifferent to it. A student might easily feel troubled that “we do not 
discuss the political and social forces shaping not just statutory law, but com-
mon law and judicial opinions as well” and experience this approach as imply-
ing “that the law will not change and if you disagree with it you are just 
wrong.”184 
Thus, some students might agree with classical criticisms that advocacy is 
“trickery and magic,” and that advocates who “have persuaded and do persuade 
anyone about anything are shapers of lying discourse.”185 This puts them in the 
position of advancing arguments that are “artfully written but not truthfully 
meant.”186 That must surely feel inauthentic and wrong,187 contributing to the 
phenomenon of law students becoming cynical and depressed over their years 
 
64, at 730 (discussing how to move toward “a more truly Socratic method of critique, one 
that can better teach analytical art to individual students while avoiding the hazards of the 
Langdellian technique”), both critics and proponents of the Langdellian approach tend to 
agree that what is currently used in law school is not a true “Socratic method.” See discus-
sion supra note 97. 
183  Justice Robert Jackson famously remarked of the Supreme Court that “[w]e are not final 
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.” Brown v. Allen, 
344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). The nuances of this lesson, however, 
may not be clear to the first-year student who assumes that finality equates to correctness, at 
least at some level. 
184  E-mail from Daniel Zemel, Graduating Student, Univ. of Richmond School of Law, to 
author (May 28, 2019, 8:38 PM) (on file with author) (discussing his experience with law 
school’s pedagogical approach, specifically in the first year). 
185  ENCOMIUM OF HELEN, supra note 2, at 10. 
186  Id. at 11. 
187  Mertz notes that the method causes students to become divorced from their authentic 
voices “as they take on the voices and perspectives pushed on them by the demands of legal 
discourse.” MERTZ, supra note 137, at 135. 
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in law school.188 Just as Plato predicted, speakers who do not know that they 
speak the truth will be unhappy. More recent research confirms this view: 
Lawyers who struggle to provide zealous representation of clients although 
they feel negatively about the way in which they do so may “suffer long-term 
psychological damage as a result.”189 
We need not condemn the Socratic method itself. Like any teaching ap-
proach, it has both advantages and disadvantages. But we should not be blind to 
its potential implications for novice advocates and their sense of authenticity 
when they are asked to play the role of advocate and articulate not the “truthful 
law” but what they perceive to be a warped and twisted version of it. The legal 
academy’s failure to explicitly recognize—and transparently reveal—the meth-
od’s eristical characteristics as well as its dialectical and epistemic characteris-
tics creates this tension. Fortunately, it is within our control to resolve it, with 
an explicit discussion about the lawyer’s role with respect to law and the legal 
system, a discussion that encompasses what “truthful law” is, what role the 
lawyer plays in shaping it and articulating it, and how lawyers act within the 
 
188  See MERTZ, supra note 137, at 27 (reporting on psychiatrist Alan Stone’s review of the 
Socratic method, which found it could negatively impact “students’ interpersonal relations 
and sense of self-esteem, a theme echoed in current studies of psychological distress among 
law students.”); Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on 
Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1407 (1997) (“At 
least since 1970, studies have consistently found that law students report an unusually high 
level of stress, psychiatric symptoms, substance abuse, anxiety, depression, and internal con-
flict . . . [and] develop a greater than average amount of psychological distress during the 
first year of law school which continues after graduation.”) (internal citations omitted); Law-
rence S. Krieger, The Inseparability of Professionalism and Personal Satisfaction: Perspec-
tives on Values, Integrity and Happiness, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 425, 441–44 (2005) [hereinaf-
ter Krieger, Inseparability of Professionalism] (summarizing data on levels of emotional 
distress among practicing lawyers, increasing levels of clinical depression experienced by 
law students over their time in law school, and decreasing levels of well-being in law stu-
dents over their first year of law school); Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence S. Krieger, Does 
Legal Education Have Undermining Effects on Law Students? Evaluating Changes in Moti-
vation, Values, and Well-Being, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 261, 261–62 (2004) (finding declines in 
subjective well-being, intrinsic motivation, and community service values over the first year 
of law school); Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence S. Krieger, Understanding the Negative 
Effects of Legal Education on Law Students: A Longitudinal Test of Self-Determination The-
ory, 33 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 883, 883 (2007) (noting that “the emotional 
distress of law students appears to significantly exceed that of medical students and at times 
to approach that of psychiatric populations”). 
189  Sofia Yakren, Lawyer as Emotional Laborer, 42 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 141, 145 (2008). 
In 2008, Sofia Yakren came to the same conclusion as Plato did centuries earlier: Advocates 
who argue for something they do not believe are miserable. See id. at 141. Yaken studied 
emotional labor theory, which holds that “organizationally defined behavior norms require 
workers to manipulate their emotions in ways that cause psychological distress.” Id. at 145. 
She concluded that: 
[E]motional labor theory teaches what the legal profession has neglected to perceive—that a 
lawyer [who struggles with negative views about a “client, case or legal strategy”] must strain to 
exhibit the requisite outward expressions despite her personal feelings, and, in some cases, will 
suffer long-term psychological damage as a result. 
Id. 
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legal system to promote justice. Part II discusses what law students need to 
hear, when they need to hear it, and where this conversation could be placed 
within the curriculum. 
II. SPEAKING TRUTHFUL LAW: WHAT STUDENTS NEED TO HEAR AND WHEN 
THEY NEED TO HEAR IT 
This Article thus far has suggested using the Socratic method could en-
courage some students to unconsciously believe that an absolute, truthful law 
exists, can be “found” by reading judicial opinions in the classroom, and cannot 
be changed by lawyers’ alternative articulations. This position is inconsistent 
with the modern legal academy’s understanding of law. Nonetheless, it lingers 
in the “hidden curriculum” of law school, working its way into the subcon-
scious mind of many first-year law students and creating a lingering unease 
about articulating law when advocating for clients. And while the second and 
third years of law school provide different styles of legal instruction and surely 
work to develop a law student’s concept of how law is made and used, that 
subconscious idea, planted at the most impressionable time in a law student’s 
studies, could be difficult to dismiss completely. When students do consciously 
dismiss it, they may do so by adopting another extreme position: that the law 
can mean anything and everything, and that advocates are not only permitted 
(by professional rules) but encouraged to adopt any nonfrivolous argument that 
suits their client’s objectives, disregarding their own understanding of truthful 
law in the situation. Even if the lawyer agrees that the client’s interests are 
compatible with justice and should be advanced, that position creates ethical 
tension with students’ desire to speak truthfully. Students should learn to ex-
plicitly separate and dissect the two assertions about advocacy that Plato con-
flated: that the good advocate should speak the truth about the law and that the 
good advocate should argue for justice. This Part discusses what law students 
need to hear to resolve the tension, when they could most benefit from that dis-
cussion, and where in the curriculum we might find space for that discussion. 
As a threshold observation, one way to minimize the problem is simply a 
more explicit and transparent explanation of the Socratic teaching method. Stu-
dents who understand the multiple purposes of the Socratic method and the rea-
sons why professors choose to use the method could be less inclined to give 
way to cynicism. However, this alone will not inoculate students from cynicism 
and distrust of the advocate; we need a robust discussion of the lawyer’s role 
and how advocates can both speak truthfully and advocate for clients: how they 
can succeed without abandoning ethics. Thus, I propose that first-year law stu-
dents should explicitly discuss the role of lawyers as advocates. 
Section A of this Part will discuss two existing models for the lawyer as 
advocate: the “neutral partisan” and the “officer of justice.” Unfortunately, 
these models do not address the particular challenge identified here: how to re-
solve the advocates’ desire to articulate “truthful law” and yet still advance the 
interests of their clients. I propose a different model: one that explicitly 
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acknowledges that law is neither determinate nor radically indeterminate; it is 
malleable, but its malleability is constrained; it is shaped by human actors.190 
Next, Section B discusses the timing of this discussion. To be most effective, 
law schools should provide a discussion of that model early in the curriculum, 
before a misunderstanding of law’s determinacy or the lawyer’s role may take 
hold within a student’s subconscious mind. Finally, Section C suggests a place 
for this discussion: within the context of a Professional Identity Formation pro-
gram beginning in the first year of law school. 
A. Models for the Lawyer as Advocate 
A novice advocate who faces the concerns identified in Part I would bene-
fit from an explicit discussion of the lawyer’s role in the legal system: the rela-
tionship between the lawyer and the law, including how the lawyer creates law 
and why the lawyer can create alternative interpretations of a rule of law in an 
advocacy setting while still acting truthfully and authentically. However, many 
of the leading models that discuss the lawyer in an advocacy role tend to focus 
on the tension that exists if the lawyer believes that the client’s desired outcome 
and goals are not “just” in a broad sense (not in the best interests of society or 
not corresponding to some absolute concept of justice).191 These approaches 
focus on the second of Plato’s assertions, that the advocate should know justice 
and advocate to achieve the just outcome.192 And as Plato did in Gorgias, they 
conflate or ignore the other assertion: a good advocate is one who knows the 
truth and advocates that truth. 
Section A.2 below proposes an approach that addresses the advocate’s rela-
tionship with truthful law. It begins with Professor Wendel’s concept of fidelity 
to law and continues with James Boyd White’s ideas of law as rhetoric.193 This 
vision of lawyers—as advocates who can identify the dimensions of truth with-
in a law and create meanings for that law that are consistent with it and yet also 
supportive of client interests—can resolve the problem identified in Part I and 
support students in their development of an authentic advocate identity. Advo-
cates may articulate and advocate for a variety of interpretations of the law 
without jeopardizing their ethics. They may and should take an active role in 
shaping the law, as they act within a specific time and place and with other ac-
tors in the system to create meaning for the law as it relates to a particular mat-
ter. This view acknowledges that lawyers do more than simply represent their 
clients’ interests and more than simply report truthful law. By articulating pos-
sible versions of law, they speak the law into existence; that law becomes truth-
ful law adopted by the courts; the advocates themselves create, not merely re-
port, truthful law. 
 
190  See discussion infra Section II.A.2. 
191  See infra Section II.A.2. 
192  See discussion of Plato’s critique supra Section I.A. 
193  See infra Section II.A.2. 
20 NEV. L.J. 1079 
Spring 2020] SPEAKING THE TRUTH 1113 
1. Advocates as Neutral Partisans or Officers of Justice 
This Section explores two models of advocacy that students may encounter 
in law school: the neutral partisan and the officer of justice. We might think of 
these two models as the extreme ends of a spectrum of lawyering roles; the first 
is the kind of advocate that Plato criticized, while the second is the kind that he 
praised.194 Both, however, share Plato’s focus on the ultimate goal of achieving 
justice while paying little attention to a focus on expressing the truth of the sub-
ject matter. The first argues that the advocate should argue for her client’s in-
terests; even if those specific goals are unjust, the dialectical process will 
achieve justice. The second argues that the advocate should take all interests 
(not only the client’s) into account and decline to advance an outcome that is 
unjust; she will argue for just outcomes and thus achieve justice. 
a. Neutral Partisan 
The neutral partisan is probably the primary (and perhaps the only) role of 
advocacy to which a student is exposed in law school.195 For many years it was 
considered the “dominant model of ethical lawyering.”196 Arguably, it still is. 
In this model, the advocate relies on the concept of “role morality,” which 
allows her to act, in her capacity as lawyer, in ways that would be repugnant to 
her in her role as an individual member of society.197 Rather than considering 
 
194  See discussion supra Section I.A. 
195  See William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional 
Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 37 (1978); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: 
Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 15 (1975). This model was dramatically articulated in 
Monroe Freedman’s 1966 article, in which he argued that a criminal defense lawyer should 
place a client on the stand even if that client would commit perjury and should discredit a 
witness even if the lawyer knows the witness to be telling the truth. See Monroe H. Freed-
man, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Ques-
tions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1469 (1966). Freedman’s article revived interest in legal eth-
ics, which had been largely dormant in the decades before; it was quickly followed by 
Richard Wasserstrom’s exploration of role morality and Charles Fried’s discussion of 
whether the good lawyer can be a good person. See, e.g., David Luban, Reason and Passion 
in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REV. 873, 878 (1999) [hereinafter Luban, Reason and Passion] 
(“It scarcely exaggerates to say that Fried and Wasserstrom reinvented legal ethics as a phil-
osophical topic.”); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
31, 38 (1992) [hereinafter Rhode, Pervasive Method]. 
196  Sharon Dolovich, Ethical Lawyering and the Possibility of Integrity, 70 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1629, 1629 (2002); see also LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 127, at 393 (arguing 
that the standard conception of lawyer’s role is in fact an accurate representation of Ameri-
can legal practice); FIDELITY TO LAW, supra note 163, at 29 (describing the standard concep-
tion as the default position of legal ethics). 
197  See Wasserstrom, supra note 195, at 7–8. Neutral partisans act in accordance with two 
primary principles of conduct: neutrality with respect to the ethical ends of their clients, and 
partisanship to advance those ends, even by means that the lawyer would consider improper 
in a non-legal context. Simon, supra note 195, at 36–37. Thus, if the client wishes to disin-
herit the client’s children for reasons the lawyer feels are wrong, or if the client could avoid 
taxes by using a legal loophole that the lawyer feels unfairly benefits the wealthy, the lawyer 
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the interests of all affected parties and preferring the interests of society over 
the interest of one individual, the “amoral lawyer” explicitly decides to “pre-
fer[,] in a variety of ways the interests of the client . . . over those of individuals 
generally.”198 The lawyer need not assess whether the client’s desires are in the 
best interests of society, or indeed even in the best interests of the client in a 
moral sense; she need only determine whether they are legally permissible.199 
The neutral partisan model appears to meet all Plato’s fears about a dishonora-
ble orator: This advocate would say “not what he believes to be true or right 
. . . , but whatever will persuade [the] audience to act in furtherance of [the cli-
ent’s] interests.”200 Adopting this role makes “the moral world of the lawyer . . . 
a simpler, less complicated, and less ambiguous world than the moral world of 
ordinary life.”201 
The neutral partisan can still defend her role as a societal good, so long as 
one assumes that lawyers are participating “in a complex institution which 
functions well only if the individuals adhere to their institutional roles.”202 The 
role of each attorney in an adversarial system is to represent client interests and, 
through the competition of those representations, an impartial and effective ju-
dicial system will reach a good and just result.203 As an advocate, the neutral 
 
need not decline representation but may ethically proceed, so long as the proposed goals and 
the means by which the lawyer and client might achieve them are not actually illegal. Was-
serstrom, supra note 195, at 6–8. Accordingly, the model triggers a third principle that gov-
erns how society should act: nonaccountability, or the premise that society should not find 
the lawyer morally culpable, as an individual, for acting as the role demands. See id. at 8–10. 
To say “I did it as a lawyer, not as a person” is sufficient justification for any legally permis-
sible act that advances the client’s interests, even if such act appears morally questionable. 
See id. at 9. 
198  Wasserstrom, supra note 195, at 5. 
199  Id. at 5–6 (“Once a lawyer represents a client, the lawyer has a duty to make his or her 
expertise fully available in the realization of the end sought by the client, irrespective, for the 
most part, of the moral worth to which the end will be put or the character of the client who 
seeks to utilize it” provided that the end is “not illegal.”); see also Dolovich, supra note 196, 
at 1629 (describing the “ ‘neutral partisan:’ one who does whatever possible, within the 
bounds of the law, to serve her client’s interests regardless of what the lawyer herself thinks 
of the client’s ends.”) (quoting William Simon). 
200  White, Ethics of Argument, supra note 42, at 872. 
201  Wasserstrom, supra note 195, at 9. For example, it allows lawyers to say “but that is not 
my concern” when faced with criticisms of helping to promote an unethical outcome (the 
classic case, perhaps, being the criminal defense attorney who represents a client known to 
be guilty). Id. 
202  Id. 
203  See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 196, at 1633–34 (noting the neutral partisan works 
through the adversarial system to allow an impartial observer “to discern what is truth and 
what is sophistry.”). This view of the adversarial system is similar to the connection made 
between the scientific method and the Socratic method; this argument that adversarial litiga-
tion leads to truth “often invokes an analogy between adversarial adjudication and an ideal-
ized image of scientific inquiry, in which every thesis is subjected to raking criticism aiming 
to probe for weaknesses, unearth contrary evidence, and ensure that no proposition enters the 
corpus of scientific doctrine based on wishful thinking.” David Luban, Twenty Theses on 
Adversarial Ethics, in BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM 134, 144 (Helen Stacy & Michael 
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partisan is thought to advance values of truth-discovery through the process of 
litigation rather than the process of the single advocate’s speech; the approach 
assumes the principle of “procedural justice,” a legitimacy that is “inherent” to 
the judicial proceeding itself.204 It is a mechanism through which truth and jus-
tice are secured, and thus advocates can assure themselves that they are “serv-
ing the needs and interests of the justice system and thus performing a vital ser-
vice for society as a whole.”205 Whether advocates who detach their true selves 
from their professional roles are actually able to function happily, or whether 
this approach comes “at too great a personal cost to lawyers . . . because it re-
sults in no self at all,” is debatable.206 And the model’s focus on the morality of 
the client’s cause or desired outcome (or whether the pursuit of that outcome 
will lead to justice) gives little or no attention to the validity of the argument 
itself, in the sense of whether it is based on some view of truthful law.207 
 
Lavarch eds., 1999). Just as with the Socratic method, however, the comparison between true 
scientific method and the adversary system is problematic. See LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra 
note 127, at 69 (“Perhaps science proceeds by advancing conjectures and then trying to re-
fute them; but it does not proceed by advancing conjectures that the scientist knows to be 
false and then using procedural rules to exclude probative evidence.”); see also id. at 68–74 
(critiquing the idea that truth emerges from the adversarial system); INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, 
supra note 152, at 53–58 (explaining and critiquing the premise that “an adversarial clash 
between opposing advocates is the best way of discovering truth.”); FIDELITY TO LAW, supra 
note 163, at 17–48 (summarizing the standard conception and criticisms of it). 
204  Simon, supra note 195, at 38. The model’s defense of the adversarial system as a dialec-
tical route to ultimate truth and justice is attractive; its “practical appeal is often irresistible, 
particularly when coupled with a regulatory framework that permits lawyers to avoid advo-
cacy that appears personally distasteful or financially imprudent” simply by allowing law-
yers to decline unwanted clients. INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 152, at 58 (noting that 
“most legal ethics experts agree [that] the moral justification for current adversarial princi-
ples is ultimately unconvincing.”); see also LAWYERS AND JUSTICE supra note 127, at 92 (ar-
guing that the adversarial system, despite its flaws, is justified because it does “as good a job 
as any at finding truth and protecting legal rights,” “some adjudicatory system is necessary,” 
and “it’s the way we have always done things”). 
205  Dolovich, supra note 196, at 1634–35. The view that advocates should be, first and 
foremost, “zealous” representatives of their clients to the detriment of the lawyer’s other, 
potentially competing roles (officer of the legal system and public citizen) may be supported 
by the Model Rules. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. no. 2, 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2019). For example, the American Bar Association states, in the Preamble to the Model 
Rules, that “when an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate 
on behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice is being done.” Id. at no. 8 (not-
ing that the “lawyer’s responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal 
system and a public citizen are usually harmonious.”). As several commentators have noted, 
this leaves open the question of whether a lawyer can assume justice is done if the opposing 
party is not well represented. See, e.g., INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 152, at 15 (“But 
this faith in adversarial processes remains plausible only if all interests have adequate repre-
sentation and comparable access to information and legal resources.”). 
206  Yakren, supra note 189, at 153. Yakren analyzes the neutral partisan model and notes 
that “[l]iterature analyzing the legal profession’s answer to lawyers’ personal-professional 
conflicts perceives a deeper, potentially more disabling, psychological danger than the legal 
profession likes to admit.” Id. at 152. 
207  See Pepper, supra note 126, at 624 (noting that “[a] relatively little explored problem is 
the dynamic between the amoral professional role and a skeptical attitude toward law.”). 
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b. Officers of Justice: Moral Advocate 
The neutral partisan model is by no means the only model available to to-
day’s advocate, nor need we lament the lack of a model that would be accepta-
ble to Plato. Recall that in Plato’s vision, the ideal advocate would have the 
goal of finding the truth of justice for any given matter and then advocating for 
that just result.208 The advantages of this approach for justice overall are clear: 
the advocate advances the just position, and that action is both morally good for 
the speaker and necessarily good for the audience and the society in which the 
speaker operates.209 
The modern equivalent to Plato’s position might be Deborah Rhode’s “of-
ficers of justice” role model.210 It represents the other end of the spectrum from 
the neutral partisan model: Instead of focusing narrowly on the client’s interests 
and ignoring all others, it considers “all the societal interests at issue in a par-
ticular practice setting,” including but not limited to those of the client.211 Law-
yers should make decisions and take actions based on principled convictions 
and with the goal of achieving just ends, and should be able to justify their con-
duct “under consistent, disinterested, and generalizable principles.”212 Client 
objectives, while relevant, “must be tempered by other important concerns.”213 
If a lawyer finds the client’s goals repugnant, she need not “rely on some ideal-
ized model of adversarial . . . processes” to justify her own role; she should 
withdraw from representation and decline to use her powers of rhetoric to ad-
vance those goals.214 One might imagine Plato might have been comfortable 
with this view of advocacy.215 
 
208  Not surprisingly, this view does not specifically address the question of how to manipu-
late a specific law to create an end result, for the Athenians did not have the same legal sys-
tem as we do. 
209  Indeed, in the Gorgias dialogue, Socrates asserts that “the orator will never will to do 
wrong” and that the advocate who knows right and wrong would thus be incapable of doing 
wrong, because he would always be “talking about right.” GORGIAS, supra note 11, at 40 
(460). As Walter Hamilton notes, these assertions depend on the assumption “that all wrong-
doing is the result of ignorance, and that perfect knowledge of what is right must inevitably 
issue in perfect conduct.” Id. at 39, n.1. 
210  INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 152, at 17. Rhode’s model is not the only critique of 
neutral partisanship that focuses on moral ends. See, e.g., LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 
127, at 173 (arguing for a “[m]oral activism” approach in which the lawyer considers third-
party interests). 
211  Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Ethics in an Adversary System: The Persistent Questions, 34 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 657 (citing her INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 152, at 66–80, 113, 
213). William Simon similarly argues that lawyers should act in a way that will, overall, 
“seem likely to promote justice.” WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY 
OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 138 (1998). 
212  INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 152, at 67. 
213  Id. at 18. 
214  Id. at 67. Rhode notes that in making such choices, “lawyers must assess their actions 
against a realistic backdrop, in which wealth, power, and information are unequally distrib-
uted, not all interests are adequately represented, and most matters will never reach a neutral 
tribunal.” Id. “The less confidence that attorneys have in the justice system’s capacity to de-
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However, the student who looks for moral instruction within law school, 
and hopes that legal education will prepare her to serve as an officer of justice, 
may be disappointed. Law school is not designed for moral education, although 
it may produce moral questions as a byproduct.216 “Teachers of law under-
standably do not ordinarily think of themselves as teachers of virtue, even 
though law is so saturated with the concept of justice that its very symbol is the 
scale of justice.”217 Many law professors appear to believe that ethical action 
cannot be taught, or at least that it cannot be taught in law school.218 
Neither the neutral partisan nor the officer of justice model pay much atten-
tion to the attorney’s relationship with the law itself and the level to which that 
law may be molded or manipulated to suit either the client’s desires (in the neu-
tral partisan model) or the interests of society balanced with the client’s (in the 
officers of justice model). The neutral partisan model’s discussion of means 
tends to focus on tactical and strategic decisions: whether it is proper to dis-
credit a truthful witness, for example.219 The discussion of means in Rhode’s 
model also focuses primarily on tactics and strategy: Should, for example, an 
advocate use the statute of limitations as a defense against a claim that is oth-
erwise worthy and just?220 While advocates “should, of course, be guided by 
relevant legal authority,”221 both models tend to assume that the law is suffi-
ciently malleable to support a variety of interpretations and also that the advo-
 
liver justice in a particular case, the greater their own responsibility to attempt some correc-
tive.” Id. Rhode does not assert that an advocate would have to withdraw from representation 
in all cases of repugnant clients; she makes an explicit exception, for example, for criminal 
defense work. See id. at 72. 
215  Plato, who found it essential for orators to know right and wrong (as discussed supra in 
Section I.A), might have enjoyed Sharon Dolovich’s theory, expanding on Rhode’s model, 
that “any complete account of ethical lawyering needs a theory of moral character.” Sharon 
Dolovich, supra note 196, at 1630. 
216  But see MacDonald, supra note 55, at 33–34 (arguing that effective use of the Socratic 
method allows exploration of the students’ own moral opinions and leads them to discover 
what justice is). 
217  Id. at 29. Rideout argues that if advocates should possess good character to appear credi-
ble, “effective teachers of rhetoric should, among other things, offer moral advice on the de-
velopment of good character,” but most teachers of persuasive communication “undoubtedly 
do not regard themselves as moral instructors.” Rideout, supra note 87, at 22. 
218  See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Moral Judgment and Professional Legitimation, 51 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1071, 1074 (2007) (discussing the “self-imposed mystification that relies upon 
an implicit belief that ethical reasoning for lawyers is a skill that cannot be taught in tradi-
tional law school courses.”); see also W. Bradley Wendel, Should Law Schools Teach Pro-
fessional Duties, Professional Virtues, or Something Else? A Critique of the Carnegie Re-
port on Educating Lawyers, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 497, 498 (2011) (arguing that “moral and 
social dimensions of legal reasoning are already embedded within legal reasoning.”). 
219  Cf. Wasserstrom, supra note 195, at 6–7. 
220  INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 152, at 71. 
221  Id. at 67 (noting that “[m]ost ethical dilemmas arise in areas where the governing stand-
ards already leave significant room for discretion” and “attorneys may confront cases in 
which the applicable rules are so indeterminate or inadequate that reference to broader moral 
principles is necessary.”). 
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cate understands the level of determinacy within the system. Both approaches, 
then, are similar in their view that advocates should focus on how to achieve an 
end result that is just. Advocates might do so indirectly, by engaging in a dia-
lectical process to reach a just result; alternatively, they might do so directly, by 
explicitly advocating the just result. Plato agreed that the advocate should work 
for justice.222 But that is not the only question with which advocates may strug-
gle. Plato—and our current models—overlook the critical question addressed in 
this Article. 
These approaches do not adequately address the question of whether and 
how lawyers should be willing and able to manipulate “the law” itself as a 
means to their desired ends, whether those ends are “just” or simply those de-
sired by their clients. After all, lawyers might be convinced of the justice of 
their clients’ desired outcomes and yet reluctant to manipulate the law if they 
feel, as Part I suggests novice advocates may, that there is an underlying truth-
ful law to which they should remain loyal.223 The Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (“Model Rules”) require, at a minimum, that advocates act not only as 
“zealous advocate[s]” but also as “officer[s] of the legal system.”224 As such, 
lawyers do have certain constraints about the way they articulate the law: They 
must not misrepresent the law,225 nor make “frivolous” arguments.226 Even 
considering these constraints, an advocate who has an underlying belief in a 
true law could feel uneasy about artfully articulating it in a way that could be 
inconsistent with its essential truth (without necessarily “misrepresenting” it 
within the meaning of the Model Rules’s prohibition). Legal realism may have 
taken hold in legal education as the “ordinary religion of the law school class-
room.”227 But students may still question the pure realist concept that the law 
has minimal determinacy and few constraints. 
I believe that students seek a way to achieve both desires: to express truth-
ful law and to advocate for clients. And they will not happily accept the idea of 
radical indeterminacy in the law or the view of lawyers as willing to manipulate 
true law. They need a new model. 
 
222  Plato argued that the orator should use his powerful skill to work for justice and good. 
See GORGIAS, supra note 11, at 35 (457) (“The orator can speak on any subject against any 
opposition in such a way as to prevail on any topic he chooses, but the fact that he possesses 
the power to deprive doctors and other professional men of their reputation does not justify 
him in doing so; he is as much bound to make a proper use of his oratory as the possessor of 
physical superiority [is bound to use his strength for good].”). 
223  See discussion supra Part I. 
224  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. no. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
225  Id. r. 3.3 cmt. 
226  Id. r. 3.1. 
227  Cramton, supra note 127, at 252. 
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2. Proposed Model: Advocates as Meaning-Makers 
I propose an alternative vision of the lawyer’s role: one in which a lawyer 
seeks to understand the truth of a law, understands the range of interpretations 
that are still truthful within law, and engages in a meaning-making process to 
help the community define itself and decide how to engage in a process of deci-
sion-making. Within this vision, advocates can speak the “truth” about the law 
and its meaning while still advocating for their clients. This model can solve 
the problem identified in Part I by envisioning a lawyer who recognizes both 
that the law is not completely indeterminate and has underlying truth to it and 
that the law is not completely determinate and has a number of possible, per-
missible versions that might be acceptable in an advocacy setting. For the for-
mer, we must explore what “truthful law” might be. For the latter, we can then 
view that law through the lens of rhetoric and see truth as constituted, not lo-
cated; it is created, not found.228 
Our starting point for this model is Professor Wendel’s argument that law-
yers should think of their role as being faithful to the law itself rather than to 
the interests of any individual or group.229 Wendel asserts that rather than al-
lowing the system to determine justice (as in the neutral partisan view) or al-
lowing the lawyer to determine justice (as in the officers of justice view), we 
should allow the political process to determine justice by respecting that pro-
cess’s given meaning to the law itself: in effect, asserting truthful law.230 Wen-
del acknowledges that law has some indeterminacy, but he holds that it is also 
true that “the law can bear some objective meaning,” and lawyers should be re-
quired to identify their best understanding of what the law actually does mean 
rather than an arguably plausible view of what it might possibly mean.231 Thus, 
the challenge is assessing the degree of determinacy within the law in a given 
context and situation.232 Law, in this approach, is neither purely formalistic nor 
purely realistic: Its meaning is neither entirely determinant not entirely inde-
terminate; “[t]he law is purposive[,] it is about something, and legal interpreta-
 
228  See Linda L. Berger, Studying and Teaching “Law as Rhetoric”: A Place to Stand, 16 J. 
LEGAL WRITING INST. 3, 5 (2010) (“[R]hetoric looks at how the law works by exploring a 
meaning-making process, one in which the law is ‘constituted’ as human beings located 
within particular historical and cultural communities write, read, argue about, and decide 
legal issues.”). 
229  See FIDELITY TO LAW, supra note 163, at 168. 
230  See id. at 2. Wendel argues that “[c]itizens can appeal to legal entitlements, which are 
different from mere interests or desires, because they have been conferred by the society as a 
whole in some fair manner, collectively, in the name of the political community.” Id. 
231  Id. at 14; see also id. at 72 (noting that “fidelity to law requires lawyers to aim at recov-
ering the best understanding of the existing law, and to act on that basis.”). Lawyers ought 
not “to be morally permitted to work around legal prohibitions on the client’s conduct, simp-
ly because the lawyer believes the law has got it wrong as a matter of justice.” Id. at 135. 
232  See id. at 70 (noting that “some interpretations of the law just won’t do, no matter how 
they appear to fit with a formalistic reading of the applicable legal texts.”). 
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tion is aimed at recovering that meaning.”233 Wendel’s approach provides con-
siderably more constraint on an advocate’s articulation of rules than the Model 
Rules do: It is not enough that a lawyer’s articulation not be “frivolous” or 
“misrepresentative,” it must be, in some sense, an accurate representation of the 
law’s true meaning.234 
One can understand Wendel’s approach more clearly with a concrete ex-
ample; fortunately, one need only look to the news to find examples of how 
lawyers might choose to speak “truthful law”—or decline to choose that path. 
Becky Roiphe and W. Bradley Wendel identify one recent example: when the 
Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Senior Litigation Counsel argued, in the sum-
mer of 2019, that the legal requirement of “safe and sanitary” conditions in mi-
grant detention centers did not require the government to provide items such as 
soap, nor necessarily allow the children to sleep.235 Making this argument, 
while it did not subject the DOJ attorney to ethical disciplinary action, put her 
in the position of stretching the law to an unrecognizable degree. Like Humpty 
Dumpty, she had to assert that the word “sanitary” meant whatever she chose it 
to mean, despite the difficulties of arguing that “sanitary” did not include soap 
or toothbrushes.236 The concept of truthful law, in contrast, asserts that the law 
has limits: while the exact parameters of “sanitary” may be debated, the mean-
ing must remain within those limits. Wendel’s view gives us an outside bound-
ary for determinacy of the law: some constraints for “truthful” law. These con-
straints address one end of our concern: they tell us that the law is not radically 
indeterminate. 
Thus constrained, advocates may remain concerned about the other end of 
the concern: whether the law may be “radically determinate” or whether they 
may assert alternative (arguable) views of the law, what their precise role is in 
 
233  Id. at 196. “[T]he whole point of the law is to differentiate between something you can 
get away with, and something that is authorized, as a matter of right, and regulated by rules 
of general application.” Id. 
234  Wendel’s focus is primarily advising clients and structuring transactions, not advocating 
for a client in litigation. See id. at 13. Indeed, he sees litigation as “a special case” in which 
“lawyers are permitted to assert the arguable legal entitlements of clients, leaving it up to the 
workings of the adversary system to evaluate whether the lawyer’s position is plausible.” Id. 
There is, thus, less constraint in advocacy (although still more constraint than the floor pro-
vided by the Model Rules). 
235  See, e.g., Meagan Flynn, Detained Migrant Children Got No Toothbrush, No Soap, No 
Sleep. It’s No Problem, Government Argues., WASH. POST (June 21, 2019, 3:59 PM), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/06/21/detained-migrant-children-no-toothbrush-soa 
p-sleep/ [https://perma.cc/KM5U-QMSP]; see also Becky Roiphe & W. Bradley Wendel,  
The DOJ Lawyer Was Wrong to Argue that the Conditions in the Detention Centers are San-
itary, but the Personal Attacks are Misplaced (Aug. 19, 2019) (unpublished op-ed) (on file 
with author). The Ninth Circuit panel of judges expressed disbelief at the position, and for-
mally rejected it in an August 15, 2019 opinion. Flores v. Barr, 934 F.3d 910, 911–12 (9th 
Cir. 2019). 
236  See Flores, 934 F.3d at 915 (noting that the government’s “cramped understanding” of 
the phrase “safe and sanitary” is “untenable”). 
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creating or shaping law, and how far they can go while still remaining ethical. 
James Boyd White and his view of the lawyer as rhetorician addresses these 
concerns. 
White sees a good degree of indeterminacy in the law for an advocate.237 
His “law as rhetoric” approach encourages advocates to strike a balance be-
tween thinking of law on the one extreme as determinate, with advocacy simply 
as “the application of doctrine learned in law school to the facts of a client’s 
case,” and on the other extreme as radically indeterminant, because “in one’s 
practice the doctrine must be learned—and that means rethought, reconstruct-
ed—over and over again, from many points of view.”238 In argument “the iden-
tity, the meaning, and the authority of the materials are always arguable, always 
uncertain,”239 and thus the law itself cannot be truthful in the sense that entering 
students or laypeople might expect. A rule should be viewed “not as a com-
mand that is obeyed or disobeyed but as the topic of thought and argument—as 
one of many resources brought to bear by the lawyer and others both to define a 
question and to establish a way to approach it.”240 This view sees lawyers as 
rhetoricians and law as rhetoric; the law exists as a social and cultural activity 
by which the lawyers, their clients, and the system all act to resolve problems 
and deal with differences.241 The lawyers provide the court with a variety of 
possible meanings for the law, a range of options. And within that acceptable 
range, the advocate may permissibly—and ethically—point out the one or more 
options that would benefit the client. This approach is similar to Wendel’s ar-
gument that because “there is a range of meanings that the law can reasonably 
be understood to bear—within that range, there is nothing wrong with the law-
yer adopting a view that is consistent with her client’s interests.”242 
Within the litigation context, this approach shares some aspects of the neu-
tral partisan model; it includes some reliance on procedural or institutional 
safeguards to ensure justice.243 However, there is an important distinction: The 
 
237  See White, Old-Fashioned, supra note 53, at 393. 
238  White, Doctrine in a Vacuum, supra note 150, at 161. White conceives of law “as an ex-
pressive and rhetorical activity.” Id. at 163. 
239  James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Com-
munal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 689 (1985) [hereinafter White, Law as Rhetoric]. 
240  Id. at 689 n.4. 
241  See id. at 691–92 (“It is a way of telling a story about what has happened in the world 
and claiming a meaning for it by writing an ending to it.”). 
242  FIDELITY TO LAW, supra note 163, at 54. 
243  For example, Wendel would allow criminal defense attorneys to assert extreme interpre-
tations of the law, noting those lawyers have “virtually no obligation to ascertain that a legal 
argument is plausible” because of constitutional and procedural issues unique to the criminal 
context. Id. at 188 (“Criminal defense lawyers rightly believe that they are permitted to ‘put 
the state to its proof . . . .”). Within civil litigation, lawyers have less leeway to argue weaker 
interpretations, but more than in the advising context, because of procedural safeguards. See 
id. (arguing that “lawyers for the parties in civil litigation also have some latitude to press 
weaker legal arguments, subject to legal prohibitions on relying on totally unsupported posi-
tions.”). The greater latitude allowed in Wendel’s view for zealous advocates to articulate 
20 NEV. L.J. 1079 
1122 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:3  
focus is on a (but not the) truthful interpretation of the law rather than an over-
all “just” outcome for the case.244 This is zealous advocacy, but with an in-
creased focus on the latter part of the phrase: “[L]awyers should represent their 
clients zealously within the bounds of the law.”245 Law is “a practice of reason-
giving, subject to certain kinds of constraints[;]” this model includes more con-
straints on that zeal: the argument must exceed a standard of simply “non-
frivolous,” but need not claim that there is a single correct interpretation of the 
law.246 
This approach rejects the neutral partisan’s dialectic approach to achieving 
the “truth” of an objectively just outcome through the clash of competing ar-
guments. It explicitly acknowledges that the truth about what the law means is 
less “a system of rules” and more “a structure of thought and expression built 
upon a set of inherently unstable, dynamic, and dialogic tensions.”247 This ap-
proach allows for change within the law through advocates’ actions, because it 
explicitly acknowledges the various roles within litigation—lawyers who assert 
various interpretations of the law and a decision-maker who chooses—and yet 
it does not allow complete freedom to manipulate the “truth” of the law.248 
The level of truth within the law comes down to a balance between forces 
that we might think of in terms of formalism versus realism, or in more classi-
cal terms, absolute versus relative truth. The more flexible (legal realism) ap-
proach to legal truth can be compared with the Sophists’ approach to truth gen-
erally. Scholars have suggested that the Sophists subscribed to “a philosophy of 
language and knowledge that suggested that the only ‘reality’ we have access to 
‘lies in the human psyche, and its malleability and susceptibility’ to linguistic 
manipulation.”249 The few works we have from the well-known Sophist practi-
tioner and teacher of rhetoric Gorgias,250 for example, suggest that he held a 
 
various versions of law relies on the assumption that “for the most part, . . . the procedures 
and personnel of the tribunal will take care of the ‘bounds of the law.’ ” Id. 
244  See, e.g., id. at 78. 
245  Id. 
246  Id. at 194. 
247  White, Old-Fashioned, supra note 53, at 386 (arguing it is “an activity of mind and lan-
guage: a kind of translation, a way of claiming meaning for experience and making that 
meaning real.”). 
248  See, e.g., FIDELITY TO LAW, supra note 163, at 207 (“The observed fact that legal mean-
ing can take shape through the process of application of law does not provide license to con-
clude that evasion of the law is ethically permissible.”). 
249  HERRICK, supra note 3, at 43. 
250  Gorgias, like Socrates, was a real person and not merely Plato’s literary creation; he may 
even have been familiar with Plato’s literary depiction of him. See Vessela Valiavitcharska, 
Correct Logos and Truth in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen, 24 RHETORICA 147, 155 n.22 
(quoting Gorgias, upon hearing of Plato’s Gorgias, as remarking “[h]ow well Plato knows 
how to satirize[]”). The real Gorgias has been acclaimed as the founder of the Sophist 
movement and of extemporaneous oration. C. Francis Higgins, Gorgias, INTERNET 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., https://www.iep.utm.edu/gorgias/ [https://perma.cc/96QL-D7YT]  
(last visited Feb. 28, 2020). 
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relativistic epistemology, in which humans are unable to objectively perceive 
reality and each individual holds “subjective mental images” of what life truly 
is.251 In contrast, Plato believed in more absolute truths, and found this Sophis-
tic view of truth distressing.252 An explicit acknowledgement of the difference 
in these views, and of the way in which legal education may confuse them, can 
resolve a novice advocate’s unease and ethical distress about articulating the 
law in a way that may not be precisely consistent with the way an appellate 
court previously articulated it. Viewing law as a rhetorical activity allows us to 
identify “an interactive process of persuasion and argumentation that is used to 
resolve uncertain questions in this setting and for the time being.”253 “Recog-
nizing that the law is constructed by human beings as they interpret, compose, 
and interact makes it possible for the law student to imagine a voice and a place 
to fit within the legal rhetorical community.”254 
White’s approach to lawyering softens the ethical tension between advoca-
cy and authenticity (in the sense of telling the truth) by including, as a critical 
component, the understanding that a lawyer’s assertion that the law “is” or “re-
quires” something is neither intended nor received as actual truth.255 The asser-
tion that lawyers make—and which can be made truthfully—is that the argu-
ment and assertions about what the law is and requires is “the best case that 
[the lawyers’] capacities and resources permit [them] to make on this side of 
the case.”256 While this approach may not change the actual argument made, it 
could change the way advocates perceive their roles within the system. 
 
251  Bruce McComiskey, Disassembling Plato’s Critique of Rhetoric in the Gorgias, 10 
RHETORIC REV. 205, 205 (1992). Bruce McComiskey argues that this view of truth would 
have been appealing to Athenians at the time Gorgias spoke; because relativistic truth does 
not allow for knowledge of immutable truth, that approach supports democracy “since de-
mocracy depends on the ability to change the opinions of others and the willingness to allow 
one’s own opinions to be changed.” Id. at 210. Perhaps this view of law should be similarly 
appealing to us today as supportive of pure democracy and democratic institutions: Law is 
“something that lawyers themselves make all the time, whenever they act as lawyers, not 
something that is made by a political sovereign.” White, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 239, at 
696. Lawyers, who are commanded by the ABA to act as “public citizens,” may well have a 
special obligation not only to promote the rule of law but also to “further the values of par-
ticipatory democracy.” Kirsten K. Davis, Rhetorical Criticism as Essential Legal Skill: Some 
Thoughts on Developing Lawyers as “Public Citizens”, 16 COMM. L. REV. 43, 43–44 (2016). 
252  For Plato, “[s]uch a radical view of truth was a threat to conservative Athenians steeped 
in Homeric virtues and traditional Greek piety.” HERRICK, supra note 3, at 41. After all, Pla-
to preferred oligarchy to democracy, and rhetorical skills for the uneducated masses could be 
dangerous; if true knowledge was available to anyone, and not limited to those of wealth and 
high birth, the very system he supported would be undermined. See McComiskey, supra note 
251, at 207. 
253  Berger, supra note 228, at 5–6. 
254  Id. at 11. 
255  See White, Ethics of Argument, supra note 42, at 882 (“No one in the courtroom would 
be surprised to learn that [a lawyer’s statement that “justice requires” or “the law requires”] 
is a form of argument and not a statement of personal beliefs.”). 
256  Id. 
20 NEV. L.J. 1079 
1124 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:3  
White’s view of law as rhetoric also includes a vision of how the lawyer 
serves justice. White’s conception of the lawyer’s role explicitly rejects Plato’s 
position that engaging with justice can be an objective, abstract activity.257 In-
stead, it must “always [be] culturally conditioned” and is a process or an activi-
ty: “[a] way[] of doing things with preexisting materials and expectations.”258 
Lawyers “preserve and improve a language of description, value, and reason” 
so that society has the tools to discuss conflicts and find a way to resolution.259 
When two lawyers litigate a matter, they serve justice not because they both 
state the “truth” of justice in the case in some absolute sense (the Platonic role), 
nor precisely because the two opposing positions can be assessed by the impar-
tial judge to determine which one is “true” (the neutral partisan role’s reliance 
on the adversarial system), nor even because one or the other necessarily states 
a faithful view of truthful law (Wendel’s view of how lawyers should articulate 
legal entitlements when advising clients). Instead, they serve justice because 
they “define the boundaries,” they show “what even these parties, opposed as 
they are, must agree to, and they tell [the judge] what topics the culture requires 
[the judge] to face and deal with.”260 The opposing arguments show judges 
“what [they have] not yet dealt with in [their] own thinking” and “provide . . . a 
testing ground for [their] own thoughts.”261 
Through this “culture of argument,” lawyers make and remake language 
and meaning in the community and facilitate the process by which members of 
that community discuss questions and conflicts and decide what should be the 
outcome of a particular case. Lawyers create the “practices that make possible 
thought about justice of a kind that is at once realistic and idealistic.”262 
Ultimately, whatever view of the end of justice is acceptable to a student 
and developing advocate (and that choice will be an individual one), thinking 
about law as a rhetorical activity provides a helpful foundation for understand-
ing advocacy as compatible with truthful action. Students deserve to understand 
from the beginning of their studies that advocacy is a creative process. It is an 
act of communication, of making meanings between parties to solve problems 
and resolve disputes. In articulating versions of the law, advocates do much 
more than simply represent those clients’ interests. They speak the law into ex-
 
257  See id. White articulates this role of the lawyer explicitly as a response to Plato’s attack 
in Gorgias, and many readers may enjoy the Socratic dialogue he uses to present it. See, e.g., 
id. at 872–94. 
258  Id. at 880. 
259  Id. 
260  Id. at 883. 
261  Id. at 883; see also FIDELITY TO LAW, supra note 163, at 196. The legal system enforces 
the distinction between a version of “the law” as any plausible interpretation and “the law” 
as the best possible view that the lawyer can assess at the time of the decision by these “rhe-
torical practices that take certain considerations into account, as part of the justification of 
legal judgments, and exclude other considerations as irrelevant.” Id. 
262  White, Ethics of Argument, supra note 42, at 889. 
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istence; they create the possible law, the law that then becomes truth; they 
speak truthful law. 
One can imagine law professors and lawyers reading this discussion and 
thinking “well, of course—this is nothing new.” But remember that these top-
ics, perhaps old to professors, are brand new and difficult for first-year stu-
dents. Even legal ethics experts disagree about the proper model for an ethical 
lawyer’s role within the system, and about the level of determinacy within the 
law. Practicing lawyers may (or, perhaps, should) struggle with these issues. As 
David Luban notes, “[i]t is unreasonable to expect lawyers to have a profes-
sor’s facility with abstractions (let alone Hercules’ facility) or a professor’s lei-
sure for reflection.”263 And yet legal education appears to assume novice advo-
cates require minimal assistance in grasping and grappling with these issues, 
just as we assume law students will easily grasp the dual (and sometimes duel-
ing) goals of the Socratic method. While law professors may not be able to 
solve all the ethical dilemmas within the practice of law, we might at least at-
tempt to explicitly articulate the challenges faced, and we might consider when 
would be an appropriate time to discuss each challenge. The next Section sug-
gests that the first year of law school is an appropriate time for law students to 
consider the role they play in creating and shaping the law, and the level of de-
terminacy they may encounter in the laws that they encounter. 
B. Timing 
An explicit discussion of the view of lawyers as meaning-makers could re-
solve the tension experienced by novice advocates; it could allow them to feel 
truthful and authentic as they express varying articulations about the meaning 
of a particular rule of law. The legal education system seems to assume that 
students will come to an understanding of their role with respect to articulating 
the law, and their role within the system, in some way, somehow, at some point 
over the course of their education. But our current approach does not ensure 
that the discussion will happen at all. And if it does, it is likely to occur in the 
later years of law school, when cynicism about the law and the lawyer’s role 
have already begun to settle in many students.264 At that point, it may well be 
too late. This Section reviews some psychological studies showing that early 
misconceptions have surprising power to influence, even if those misconcep-
tions are revealed and corrected later; thus, it is critically important that law 
school include an explicit and robust discussion of legal determinacy early in 
the first year. 
As some students enter law school with the belief that they are there to 
“learn the law,” and then experience a classroom dynamic that appears to re-
 
263  Luban, Reason and Passion, supra note 195, at 895 (critiquing a particularly complex 
aspect of William Simon’s model as overly advanced for practicing attorneys). 
264  See, e.g., Krieger, Inseparability of Professionalism, supra note 188, at 443 (showing 
increasing levels of depression from pre-law to first-year law students). 
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veal “the law,” their belief in determinant law is reinforced. People tend to fil-
ter new information through their existing beliefs, and to accept and emphasize 
information that tends to support previously held beliefs but reject and deem-
phasize information that tends to contradict those beliefs.265 And these underly-
ing beliefs and concerns may linger, even if a discussion of legal determinacy 
and lawyer roles in the second or third year of study contradicts the initial mis-
conception of law and even if students consciously reject the idea of absolute 
legal determinacy. Cognitive psychologists have demonstrated that unconscious 
beliefs, even ones that are consciously disavowed, can impact feelings and be-
havior.266 Indeed, it is a “well-known cognitive principle” that the human 
brain’s way of organizing knowledge267 can result in unconscious associations 
(including, but not limited to negative biases) about topics.268 People form atti-
tudes not only through conscious, logical thought processes but through uncon-
scious or subconscious processes.269 
Once formed, subconsciously held beliefs can persist even if the individu-
als cannot clearly articulate why they hold the belief or specifically relate the 
information that led them to it. For example, a study was performed on people 
who were unable (because of a type of amnesia) to retain newly received in-
formation in their memory.270 The participants received information about can-
didates that either indicated that the candidates held views similar or dissimilar 
to the participants’ views on various issues.271 When asked later to choose a 
candidate, the participants preferred the candidates whose views had been de-
scribed as similar to their own, even though the participants could not, due to 
 
265  See KAHNEMAN, supra note 160, at 80–81 (explaining confirmation bias, in which “peo-
ple . . . seek data that are likely to be compatible with the beliefs they currently hold.”). 
266  Lawyers may be most familiar with the concept of how subconsciously held views can 
influence behavior in the context of implicit bias. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 279 and 
accompanying text. 
267  Our minds organize information into categories, structures called schemas, and then pull 
information from a relevant schema to understand how the world works. See JENNIFER K. 
ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS: UNDERSTANDING THE 
HUMAN FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND DECISION MAKING 12–13 (2012). This 
allows us to operate on a daily basis without reexamining every piece of information we re-
ceive; we can make inferences and judgments based on our prior understanding of what kind 
of situation we now face. See id. We have a schema for types of people and base our expec-
tations of their behavior on that schema. Id. at 12. For example, if we hear our doorbell ring, 
and see a man in a brown uniform standing on our front porch, with a van marked “UPS” in 
the driveway, we will expect that upon opening the door he will hand us a package and ask 
us to sign for it. See id. 
268  See John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Bias is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A 
Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten 
Studies That No Manager Should Ignore, 29 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 29, 43 (2009) (“[K]nowledge 
is organized in memory in the form of semantic associations that are derived from personal 
experiences as well as normative procedures and rules.”). 
269  See generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 160. 
270  Jason C. Coronel et al., Remembering and Voting: Theory and Evidence from Amnesic 
Patients, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 837, 838 (2012). 
271  See id. 
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their amnesia, actually recall what the candidates’ positions were.272 The “be-
lief echoes” continued to influence, even though the beliefs themselves were 
gone.273 
Subconscious beliefs also continue to influence actions and thought even 
after the individual learns the original impression or information was false. For 
example, psychological studies have demonstrated that people may continue to 
believe previously received false information about political candidates even 
after receiving corrected information.274 This is particularly true when the ini-
tial information conformed to the individuals’ original beliefs or feelings.275 
For example, in one study, participants read factual information about a ficti-
tious political candidate: that the candidate had received political contributions 
from a convicted felon.276 Even after reading another article that directly stated 
that the prior information was erroneous (that the contributor was not a felon, 
but a law-abiding citizen with a name similar to a convicted felon), participants 
who had received the initial negative information held a more negative view of 
the candidate than participants who had received no information about the con-
tribution.277 This is known as belief persistence, in which “people maintain 
their misperceptions even in the face of seemingly credible corrections.”278 
There is no reason to think that these phenomena are limited to the political 
sphere. After all, we know that lawyers are impacted by implicit bias.279 And 
 
272  Instead of justifying their choice with recalled information about the candidates’ posi-
tions, the participants articulated general feelings about the perceived trustworthiness or 
likeability of the candidates. See id. at 844. Thorson notes that “the automatic affective re-
sponse generated by the initial information had shaped their summary evaluations.” Emily 
Thorson, Belief Echoes: The Persistent Effects of Corrected Misinformation, 33 POL. COMM. 
460, 464 (2016). 
273  Thorson, supra note 272, at 476. 
274  See, e.g., id. 
275  See id. at 462. 
276  Id. at 466. 
277  Id. at 467–69. 
278  Id. at 462. 
279  See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific 
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 951 (2006) (noting that implicit biases “can produce 
behavior that diverges from a person’s avowed or endorsed beliefs or principles”); see also 
PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HELPING COURTS ADDRESS 
IMPLICIT BIAS: RESOURCES FOR EDUCATION A-7 (2012) (citing studies that implicit bias “pre-
dicts the rate of callback interviews,” “predicts awkward body language which could influ-
ence whether folks feel that they are being treated fairly or courteously,” “predicts how we 
read the friendliness of facial expressions,” “predicts more negative evaluations of ambigu-
ous actions by an African American,” “predicts voting behavior in Italy,” and “predicts  
binge drinking, suicide ideation, and sexual attraction to children”), https://cdm16501.co 
ntentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/accessfair/id/246 [https://perma.cc/U3E2-GHFF]; Jost et  
al., supra note 268, at 42–43 (citing “studies, which have been replicated and extended in 
literally hundreds of peer-reviewed articles, establish[ing] that people can possess attitudes, 
stereotypes, and prejudices in the absence of intention, awareness, deliberation, or effort”); 
Nicole E. Negowetti, Navigating the Pitfalls of Implicit Bias: A Cognitive Science Primer for 
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lawyers are often unaware of the gap between their conscious actions and be-
liefs and their unconscious beliefs, including within the ethical arena.280 When 
cognitive load is high or when we are stressed or rushed (as in much of law 
school), people are more likely to rely on mental shortcuts and instinctive feel-
ings.281 Such reliance could obscure the ability to assess whether a feeling (of 
uneasiness, for example, about whether lawyers are speaking truthful law or 
simply pandering to clients’ wishes with manipulative techniques) is well-
founded or based on inaccurate information or perceptions.282 The “belief 
echo” impact of determinant law might persist.283 
The most effective way to reduce the impact of belief echoes and belief 
persistence is not to allow false information to gain a firm hold initially.284 To 
prevent the mistaken belief in the first place, law school should provide a dis-
cussion of lawyers’ roles in articulating and shaping law at the outset: in the 
first year. That foundational discussion would help students make sense of the 
rest of their legal education, including their summer internships, and could en-
courage engagement in upper-level courses as well as healthy habits and mind-
set. 
C. Placement 
One suspects that for most law schools, the only required class in which a 
robust version of this discussion would occur is a Professional Responsibility 
class.285 A class on legal ethics seems a natural location for this conversation, 
 
Civil Litigators, 4 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 278, 281 (2014) (noting the 
effect of implicit bias within the courtroom). 
280  Research on behavioral legal ethics suggests that there is a disconnect between lawyers’ 
“perceptions of their ethics or moral code and their actual behavior when faced with ethical 
dilemmas.” Catherine Gage O’Grady, Behavioral Legal Ethics, Decision Making, and the 
New Attorney’s Unique Professional Perspective, 15 NEV. L.J. 671, 672 (2015). This dis-
connect is likely to be more significant for the less experienced lawyer. Id. at 679. 
281  Daniel Kahneman has described how our mind uses two different systems to operate: 
“System 1,” which consists of intuitive reactions and operates “automatically and quickly, 
with little or no effort,” and “System 2,” which consists of deliberate attention to solving 
problems and concentrating on issues. KAHNEMAN, supra note 160, at 20–21. If cognitive 
load is high, people have more difficulty paying attention and revert to System 1, which re-
quires less concentration than System 2. See id. at 22–23. Daniel Kahneman puts it simply: 
“[A]nything that occupies your working memory reduces your ability to think.” Id. at 30. 
Increased cognitive load thus decreases our ability to think carefully. O’Grady, supra note 
280, at 686. Not surprisingly, it can also “contribute to poor ethical decision making.” Id. 
282  Cognitive psychologist Daniel Willingham has concluded that thinking (perhaps particu-
larly the deliberate thinking characterized by Kahneman as System 2) is “slow, effortful, and 
uncertain,” and we would rather avoid it if we can. WILLINGHAM, supra note 160, at 4, 14. 
He notes deliberate thinking does not guide people’s behavior in most situations and that 
human minds “are not especially well-suited to thinking.” Id. at 14. 
283  See Thorson, supra note 272, at 460. 
284  See id. at 476. 
285  In the summer of 2019, Research Assistant Gemma Fearn (expected J.D. 2021) reviewed 
school websites to assess the ethics requirements for the “top thirty law schools” according 
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and the American Bar Association requires each law school to offer a class that 
focuses on ethics (or, at least, on professional responsibility).286 Unfortunately, 
professional responsibility classes often tend to focus on preparation for the 
Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination rather than for the ethical 
practice of law.287 We probably cannot assume that a Professional Responsibil-
ity class will effectively cover all ethical issues, including the role of the lawyer 
in articulating law. And although students might choose to take electives (either 
in the form of traditional classes or experiential learning opportunities such as 
clinics) that discuss the advocate’s role and relationship with legal determinacy, 
we cannot assume all students will take one of these classes.288 
 
to U.S. News & World Report. Her research indicates that to the extent these schools require 
more than the ABA-mandated two-credit course in Professional Responsibility, it is usually 
only to make that required course worth three credits (as opposed to, for example, requiring 
additional ethics classes). (Schools that require a three-credit course to satisfy the ABA re-
quirement include: University of Texas, University of Minnesota, Notre Dame, Boston Uni-
versity, University of Alabama, Emory University, University of Georgia, and University of 
Iowa). Gemma Fearn, Top 30 Law School Assertions (2019) (unpublished student research, 
University of Richmond School of Law) (on file with author). While this is neither a com-
prehensive nor necessarily representative data set for law schools, it might prompt those 
readers who are within the academy to ask themselves about their own institution’s gradua-
tion requirement for Ethics courses. 
286  Standard 303. CURRICULUM 
(a) A law school shall offer a curriculum that requires each student to satisfactorily complete at 
least the following: 
(1) one course of at least two credit hours in professional responsibility that includes substantial 
instruction in rules of professional conduct, and the values and responsibilities of the legal pro-
fession and its members; . . . . 
AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW 
SCHOOLS 2019-2020, at 16, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/le 
gal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/standards/2019-2020/2019-2020-aba-standards-
and-rules-of-procedure.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9DR-JJ5P]. 
287  See, e.g., Muriel J. Bebeau & Verna E. Monson, Guided by Theory, Grounded in Evi-
dence: A Way Forward for Professional Ethics Education, in HANDBOOK OF MORAL AND 
CHARACTER EDUCATION 557, 562 (L. Nucci & D. Narvaez eds., 2008) (“Courses are de-
signed to teach legal rules, rather than to teach legal ethics, and their primary purpose ap-
pears to be to prepare students for the professional responsibility licensing examination re-
quired in all states.”); W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 
75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 10 (1999) (“The law of lawyering has mostly swallowed up what 
could potentially be a more explicitly value-centered professional responsibility education, 
so that students’ exposure to legal ethics consists primarily of exegesis of the disciplinary 
codes and other legal texts.”); see also James E. Moliterno, An Analysis of Ethics Teaching 
in Law Schools: Replacing Lost Benefits of the Apprentice System in the Academic Atmos-
phere, 60 CIN. L. REV. 83, 83–84 (1991) (noting “well-founded” critiques that legal educa-
tion was not doing enough to teach legal ethics). 
288  Elective courses on ethics, like elective courses on professional formation, “draw ‘the 
choir’ from the student body who are very interested in personal and professional growth 
toward later stages of development [on professional formation learning outcomes].” Neil 
Hamilton & Jerome M. Organ, Thirty Reflection Questions to Help Each Student Find 
Meaningful Employment and Develop an Integrated Professional Identity (Professional 
Formation), 83 TENN. L. REV. 843, 876 (2016). 
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Even if we assume that all professional responsibility courses provide a 
discussion of lawyers’ roles in shaping law and the determinacy of the law, or 
that every student will take an upper-level jurisprudence class, ethics seminar, 
or experiential learning class (such as a clinic) that explicitly discusses the nu-
ances of legal realism, this information might come too late to effectively as-
suage law students’ concerns.289 Such classes are often available only during 
the second or third year of law school.290 As discussed above, the beliefs 
formed during the formative year of study may well linger, subconsciously, 
even if an explicit discussion corrects the underlying misconceptions.291 Fortu-
nately, a discussion of this particular issue could easily fit into the first-year 
portion of a Professional Identity Formation (PIF) program. 
PIF began to gain serious attention as a result of the Carnegie Report’s cri-
tique of legal education in 2008 and the surrounding conversations about 
whether law schools needed to do more to support ethical development within 
their students.292 The Carnegie Report articulated three “apprenticeships” of 
law, including one focused on doctrinal knowledge, one on skills, and one on 
“identity and purpose.”293 This third apprenticeship’s primary purpose was “to 
teach the skills and inclinations, along with the ethical standards, social roles, 
and responsibilities that mark the professional.”294 One of the main conclusions 
of the Carnegie Report was that this third apprenticeship received less attention 
than the other two, and needed to be more fully developed and emphasized in 
law schools.295 
The third apprenticeship is broadly defined, and the term “professional 
identity formation” can cover a multitude of topics, including the skills im-
portant to legal employers upon hiring or the skills law schools should consider 
in admitting new students.296 For our purposes here, however, it includes the 
 
289  If we could be certain that Professional Responsibility courses would fully cover all ethi-
cal issues in addition to the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, we might consider 
simply moving PR to the first-year curriculum as a solution. However, many experts in the 
field believe that first-year students are not ready for extensive discussions of professional 
responsibility. See, e.g., Rhode, Pervasive Method, supra note 195, at 51 (“If the course oc-
curs in the first year of training, many students will not yet know enough to grasp the full 
dimensions of professional dilemmas.”). Instead, Rhode suggests discussion of ethical issues 
throughout the curriculum, with a “required introduction” within the first year. See id. at 54. 
290  Research Assistant Gemma Fearn (expected J.D. 2021) conducted research on PIF 
course offerings. See Gemma Fearn, PIF Course Offerings (2019) (unpublished student re-
search, University of Richmond School of Law) (on file with author). 
291  See supra Section II.B. 
292  See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 7, at 331. 
293  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 6, at 27–29. 
294  Id. at 28. 
295  See Sullivan, supra note 7, at 334 (noting that the Carnegie Report concluded that the 
third apprenticeship was “generally marginal and often hard to clearly identify in the curricu-
lum”). 
296  See, e.g., Marjorie M. Schultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness: 
Broadening the Basis for Law School Admission Decisions, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 620, 
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concept of assisting a newcomer to the profession to develop a sense of oneself 
as a lawyer, including the lawyer’s role relative to the articulation and creation 
of law. The development of a lawyerly identity—a sense of how one relates to 
the law, to one’s clients, to the legal system, and to society as a whole—fits 
squarely within the PIF umbrella.297 Viewing the determinacy (or malleability) 
of law as a threshold concept within legal education further supports the place-
ment of this topic in a professional identity course; because such concepts are 
transformative, mastering a threshold concept “can shift [] the learner’s identi-
ty.”298 
PIF is separate from professionalism, or the ability to act in a manner that 
comports with the norms of the profession. It is also separate from the rules of 
professional responsibility, or the ability to act within the constraints that pro-
fession has set out for itself as a floor for ethical behavior. PIF, in contrast, 
deals not only with the lawyer’s understanding of professional culture, and not 
only with the ability to fit in with that culture by behaving appropriately, but 
with the lawyer’s own sense of self: how she, personally, sees herself in the 
role of lawyer, how her own ethics and moral code integrate with her actions as 
a lawyer, how she interacts with the law itself, and how her actions may pro-
mote justice.299 
“[L]aw-learning is fundamentally a process of human development that 
must embrace the relationships and tensions between self, client, legal system, 
and society.”300 Although one might hope that this type of development would 
occur during law school without explicit effort, that seems unlikely. The cur-
rent methods might achieve this goal in theory, but in practice perhaps only the 
highest achievers in a classroom realize all the learning goals we might hope to 
accomplish.301 Indeed, the statistics on lawyer dissatisfaction and disconnect 
with their profession suggest that many lawyers may never fully develop a pro-
 
623–25 (2011); Heather Buchanan, Denver Law Course Highlights Lawyer Well-Being and 
Foundations for Practice, IAALS (Sept. 27, 2018), https://iaals.du.edu/blog/denver-law-cour 
se-highlights-lawyer-well-being-and-foundations-practice [https://perma.cc/N27M-A9NQ]. 
297  See Margaret Chon, Multidimensional Lawyering and Professional Responsibility, 43 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1137, 1139 (1992) (“Role-playing—in the sense of us playing the roles  
rather than the roles playing us—is the process of expressing our identities, including our  
ethical identities.”). 
298  Weresh, supra note 140, at 691. Weresh notes that although it is difficult for students to 
accept the concept of legal malleability, once is it understood, “students cross a threshold 
and their understanding of the law, and of legal reasoning, is transformed. They no longer 
will view the law as a fixed set of rules but will appreciate the role the advocate has in shap-
ing legal argument and the resulting institution of law.” Id. at 711. 
299  See E. SCOTT FRUEHWALD, HOW TO GROW A LAWYER: A GUIDE FOR LAW SCHOOLS, LAW 
PROFESSORS, AND LAW STUDENTS 164 (2018). 
300  Cedrone, supra note 171, at 782. 
301  See FRUEHWALD, supra note 299, at 165 (“Traditional teaching of legal ethics in law 
school has not created professional identity for lawyers.”); Merritt, supra note 178 (arguing 
only a small portion of students achieve all the goals of Socratic method);. 
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fessional identity that satisfies them, and that “many lawyers appear to exist in 
painful conflict with their professional selves.”302 
In the decade since the Carnegie Report concluded that the third appren-
ticeship was “generally marginal and often hard to clearly identify in the cur-
riculum,”303 law schools have taken significant steps towards achieving actual 
change in their curricula.304 By 2011, Educating Tomorrow’s Lawyers (ETL) 
had emerged as a “consortium of schools committed to working toward imple-
menting the reform program outlined in the Carnegie Report.”305 The Holloran 
Center for Ethical Leadership in the Professions at the University of St. Thom-
as School of Law has played a leading role in gathering data, developing re-
sources, and training legal educators to successfully implement PIF pro-
grams.306 Since 2014, the Center has offered workshops to law school faculty 
and staff that focus on professional identity formation.307 The American Bar 
Association has also taken note of the need for more “third apprenticeship” 
work in law school, and promulgated Standards 301–302, which require law 
schools to provide rigorous education and learning outcomes related to eth-
ics.308 
 
302  Yakren, supra note 189, at 156. While Yakren’s comment is more focused on the general 
ethical conflict lawyers may feel in representing clients or outcomes that are morally prob-
lematic, her comment would be equally valid to the specific challenge discussed in this Arti-
cle of lawyers who feel uneasy in their promotion of a particular interpretation of law. 
303  Sullivan, supra note 7, at 334. 
304  See, e.g., id. at 331, 334, 338, 343 (describing reaction and response to the Carnegie Re-
port). 
305  Id. at 337. 
306  Id. at 343 (discussing the Holloran Center’s workshops aimed as exploring research and 
“experiment[ing] with approaches to integrating professional formation more fully into the 
curriculum, classrooms, and clinics” and identifying Holloran Center’s pioneering work with 
a “model formation curriculum” that won the ABA’s Gambrell Professionalism Award in 
2015). 
307  See id. at 343; Jerome M. Organ, First-Year Courses/Programs Focused on Professional 
Development and Professional Identity Formation: Many Flowers are Blooming, PD Q., 
Aug. 2017, at 24, available at http://www.stephanoffmedia.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/0 
7/PDQ-Aug2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/KE5J-BLL5]. The author of this Article participated  
in one such workshop in the spring of 2018. 
308  Standard 301 states: 
Standard 301. OBJECTIVES OF PROGRAM OF LEGAL EDUCATION 
(a) A law school shall maintain a rigorous program of legal education that prepares its students, 
upon graduation, for admission to the bar and for effective, ethical, and responsible participation 
as members of the legal profession. 
(b) A law school shall establish and publish learning outcomes designed to achieve these objec-
tives. 
AM. BAR ASS’N, REVISED STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 14 (Aug. 2014), 
 available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_ 
and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/201406_revised_standards_cle
an_copy.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/BX3F-9KS7]. Standard 302 requires schools to  
develop learning outcomes that will “at a minimum, include competency” in the “[e]xercise 
of proper professional and ethical responsibilities to clients and the legal system” as well as 
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While law schools’ reactions to the call for PIF has varied, there seems to 
be an interest in developing PIF across the three years of law schools and in en-
suring that PIF, including its ethical aspects, is introduced early (in the first 
year of school).309 This movement is encouraging, if overdue; long before the 
Carnegie Report, legal ethics scholars had called for increased focus on ethics 
across the curriculum as well as early introduction of the topic.310 By August 
2017, at least thirty law schools had developed “a required first-year course that 
has some intentional emphasis on professional development including profes-
sional formation.”311 By November 2019, that number had increased to sixty-
two.312 And early introduction of PIF appears advisable, not only for the rea-
sons discussed above regarding unconscious beliefs, but also to capitalize on 
student interest; one professor noted that there is a six-week period at the start 
of each semester of the first year when students are “excited about the ideology 
 
“[o]ther professional skills needed for competent and ethical participation as a member of 
the legal profession.” Id. ABA Standards 301–02 were legally effective at the end of the 
ABA meeting in August 2014. AM. BAR ASS’N, Transition to and Implementation of the New 




309  See Hamilton & Organ, supra note 288, at 876 (noting that legal education’s “usual mis-
take [in teaching PIF ethics] has been to create engagements that appeal to the students at 
later stages of development but do not appeal to the earlier stage students.”). 
310  See, e.g., INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 152, at 200–03; Rhode, Pervasive Method,  
supra note 195, at 54 (advising “required introduction to professional responsibility issues in 
the first year, an upper-level course that gives them central treatment, and efforts at integra-
tion in other core courses and in special supplemental events such as panels, lectures, and so 
forth.”); see also Deborah L. Rhode, The Professional Responsibilities of Professors, 51 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 158, 164–66 (2001). 
311  Organ, supra note 307, at 24. 
312  Rupa Bhandari & Jerry Organ, Law School Professional Development Initiatives in the 
First Year, HOLLORAN CTR. https://www.stthomas.edu/hollorancenter/learningoutcomesand 
professionaldevelopment/professionaldevelopmentdatabase/ [https://perma.cc/5925-QXT3]  
(last visited Mar. 7, 2020) (listing sixty-two “first-year, required, law school professional 
development initiatives based on information from law school websites as of November 
2019.”). Forty-four law schools have a “required, credit-bearing course[] in the first-year” 
and eighteen have a non-credit course of graduation requirement. Id. Leading law schools 
are among the schools taking this step. In summer 2019, a review by Gemma Fearn (ex-
pected J.D. 2021) of websites of law schools identified by U.S. News & World Report as the 
“top thirty law schools” revealed that at least eight appear to provide some kind of class in 
the first year that provides PIF experiences. Several either require or offer as an elective a 
first-year course that satisfies the ABA Professional Responsibility requirement, including 
the University of Southern California (required 1L Legal Ethics), Arizona State University 
(required 1L three-credit PR course), University of California Irvine (required 1L Legal Pro-
fession course), University of Michigan (1Ls eligible to take PR course as first-year elec-
tive), Duke University (nonacademic, professional development credits required beginning 
1L year), Vanderbilt (1L Life of the Law course), Harvard (week-long January Experiential 
Term), and University of California Los Angeles (Introduction to the Lawyer/ Client Rela-
tionship course). See Gemma Fearn, PIF Course Offerings (2019) (unpublished student re-
search, University of Richmond School of Law) (on file with author). 
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of fighting for justice” and most open to discussions of how they can promote 
that.313 This excitement provides an opportunity for the discussion of the law-
yer’s role and the lawyer’s relation to the law and legal system, and potential 
for students to internalize foundational beliefs that can help them maintain en-
thusiasm and commitment to their chosen career, not only during law school 
but after graduation and throughout their practice.314 Law students exposed to 
this information “build their knowledge about practices and practice settings in 
an intelligent way,” “learn what questions to ask” about their career, and “be-
come more interested in lawyers” and lawyering.315 
Developing the precise dimensions of an “ideal” PIF program would re-
quire thoughtful attention not only to the issues discussed within this Article 
but also to the particular qualities of a school’s students. Different schools have 
different focal points and opportunities, with students who plan to enter a wide 
variety of fields; what is best for one school might be ill-suited for another. One 
might imagine a variety of PIF programs that could include the type of discus-
sion recommended here. 
Schools might also successfully choose to integrate PIF concepts, including 
the ones that are the focus of this Article, across the curriculum. Starting in the 
first year, each law professor might plan to include some discussion of legal de-
terminacy and lawyering roles into the class. While this type of conversation 
already occurs in legal writing classrooms across the country, there is no good 
reason to silo it; instead, the concepts can and should be discussed and rein-
forced in each class. 
CONCLUSION 
Law students arrive eager to learn the law; they enter school with the lay-
person’s conviction that law exists in an absolute form, to be found and ap-
plied. They are greeted with the Socratic method, with its confusing mixture of 
truth-seeking and disputation activities; they experience the “ordinary religion” 
of law school in the form of legal realism and its approach that law can be 
stretched to almost any measure while they simultaneously learn, through repe-
tition in the classroom, that there are correct doctrinal answers and that this tell-
ing of “true” law will be rewarded on exams. The sources of law, and the role 
 
313  Danny DeWalt, Practical Lessons Learned While Building a Required Course for Pro-
fessional Identity Formation, 14 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 433, 434 (2018). Professor DeWalt 
notes that “[d]uring this time there is a rare culture of humility and openness that provides a 
pedagogical advantage. Students seem more inclined to listen to anything that will help them 
succeed in law school and the profession.” Id. 
314  See, e.g., Hamilton & Organ, supra note 288, at 876. Part III of that article provides re-
flection questions on “Understanding my Role as a Lawyer, Particularly in Terms of My Re-
sponsibilities to the Legal System.” Id. at 889–91. 
315  Ann Southworth et al., Some Realism About Realism in Teaching About the Legal Pro-
fession, in 1 THE NEW LEGAL REALISM: TRANSLATING LAW-AND-SOCIETY FOR TODAY’S 
LEGAL PRACTICE 74, 76 (Elizabeth Mertz et al. eds., 2016) (describing the required first-year 
course on The Legal Profession at UC Irvine Law School). 
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of lawyers in creating and changing law, are obscured. The result may be that 
students internalize a view that advocates cleverly manipulate arguments to win 
at any cost, heedless of the truth of the law. That view negatively impacts stu-
dents’ perceptions of themselves as advocates, contributing to cynicism and 
discontent that increases during law school. This contribution may be small, but 
its pernicious addition to the cumulative impact that makes law school emo-
tionally fraught for many and soul crushing for some is all the more distressing 
because it is unnecessary. 
Some students, perhaps those who are particularly motivated or who fortui-
tously encounter a discussion of the topic, will come to a comfortable under-
standing of the determinacy of law and the lawyer’s role in articulating truthful 
law. But many students need more help than law professors might expect; they 
need help to make these connections and the connections among their own 
goals (for successful and meaningful employment), formation of a professional 
identity, and law school curriculum.316 Placement of this discussion within a 
PIF program in the first year of law school could resolve the tension discussed 
in Part I and set students off on a good start towards understanding their rela-
tionship with law, not only intellectually but at a gut level of feeling the appro-
priateness of articulating varying meanings for law, believing that they can au-
thentically articulate versions of the law’s meaning while remaining loyal to 
their own voices, senses of self, and commitment to honesty.317 
We need not rely on serendipity and simply hope that students will some-
how figure it out. An early discussion of the relationship between lawyers and 
law, and the role of lawyers within the legal system, could forestall mistaken 
beliefs before they take hold, and avoid this particular danger of legal educa-
tion’s hidden curriculum. First-year law students can find a balance between 
Plato’s absolute truth and Sophistic relativism, between extreme formalism and 
extreme realism. They can identify a truthful law to which they can be faithful, 
more constrained than the Model Rules’s prohibition on non-frivolous or mis-
leading arguments but less constrained than the Langdellian concept of law as a 
science. They can imagine a role for themselves in shaping and creating law, a 
role within the system that could promote justice, at a time when they are likely 
focused on and energized about justice and their ability to produce it. They can 
see themselves not only speaking truthful law but creating it, articulating mean-
ings between parties to shape one that will work in this situation for this pur-
pose. And in the process of exploring law, its determinacy and its sources, they 
 
316  See Hamilton & Organ, supra note 288, at 861–63. 
317  Happiness research firmly supports the proposition that people are more content when 
engaged in activities they identify as meaningful and connected to a greater good. See, e.g., 
RHODE, INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 152, at 45 (Rhode quotes The Importance of What 
We Care About by Harry Frankfurt: “Individuals are most fulfilled when they are engaged in 
work that they find meaningful and when they have reflected, at the deepest level, about 
what work meets that definition.”). PIF, and the creation of an identity consistent with an 
individual’s sense of ethics, should increase happiness amongst lawyers. See Hamilton & 
Monson, supra note 112, at 328–29. 
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can also explore themselves: their own level of comfort in how far to stretch the 
meaning of a specific rule in a specific situation, based on their own moral cen-
ter and ethical beliefs. This type of self-exploration is precisely what can be 
provided within PIF programming. Some answers, Socrates would agree, can 
only be found within. So, after all, who knows? Perhaps this particular process 
would placate even Plato. 
